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COMMENTS
THE MEDICARE ANTI-KICKBACK PROVISION
OF THE SOCIAL SECURITY ACT-IS
IGNORANCE OF THE LAW AN EXCUSE
FOR FRAUDULENT AND ABUSIVE
USE OF THE SYSTEM?
The Social Security Act of 1965 established the Medicare program to
cover the cost of health care services for the elderly.1 This program pro-
vides federal funds to reimburse health care providers for the health care
of individuals over the age of sixty-five who are eligible for Social Secur-
ity, or individuals who are disabled or suffering from end-stage renal dis-
ease.' Although Medicare provides vital financial support for some thirty
1. Social Security Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-97, 79 Stat. 286, 291 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.). Medicare was created under Title XVIII of
the Act. For legislative history regarding the development of the Medicare program, see S.
Rep. No. 404, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965), reprinted in 1965 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1943; H.R.
CONF. REP. No. 682, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965), reprinted in 1965 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2228.
For a discussion regarding the Medicare program and its administration, see David M.
Frankford, The Medicare DRGs: Efficiency and Organizational Rationality, 10 YALE J. ON
REG. 273 (1993) (discussing Medicare reimbursement under the Prospective Payment Sys-
tem (PPS)); Michael Neeley-Kvarme, Administrative and Judicial Review of Medicare Is-
sues: A Guide Through the Maze, 57 NOTRE DAME LAW. 1 (1981) (discussing the
procedures for administrative and judicial review when determining eligibility under the
program).
The federal statute and regulations governing Medicare are located at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395-
1395ccc (1988 & Supp. V 1993) and Health Care Financing Administration, Dep't of
Health and Human Services, 42 C.F.R. Pts. 400-24 (1994). Additionally, the Health Care
Financing Administration (HCFA) publishes operating guidelines regarding Medicare. See
Carol Small Jimenez, Medicare Overview, in PLANNING FOR AGING OR INCAPACITY 1994:
LEGAL AND FINANCIAL ISSUES 119 (PLI Estate Planning & Admin. Course Handbook
Series No. D-231, 1994) (outlining the Medicare program).
2. 42 U.S.C. § 1395c (1988 & Supp. V 1993). Persons over the age of 65 not eligible
for Social Security or Railroad Retirement benefits can purchase hospital insurance bene-
fits under Medicare for a monthly fee. 42 C.F.R. § 408.20(a) (1994). The individual wish-
ing to purchase Medicare Part A benefits must be at least 65 years old; must be a resident
of the United States or a legal alien under specified circumstances; must not be eligible for
hospital insurance under another provision; and must already be enrolled for Medicare
Part B, or must simultaneously register for such coverage when he applies for Medicare
Part A. 42 U.S.C. § 1395i-2(a) (1988); 42 C.F.R. § 408.20(b) (1994). See infra notes 21-23
(discussing the details of Medicare Part A and Part B).
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million recipients, the program loses billions of dollars to fraud each
year.3 Thus, when Congress has attempted to revamp Medicare, it has
focused on issues of fraud and abuse.4 With the system on the brink of
bankruptcy, the curtailment of fraud is paramount.5 Significant debate
For a general overview of Medicare coverage, see Bernard A. Poskus, Medicare Practice:
A Primer, 24 COLO. LAW. 1789 (1995) (summarizing the Medicare system); John Bigler et
al., An Overview of Social Security, Medicare and Medicaid, 65 N.Y. ST. B.J., Sept./Oct.
1993, at 14 (summarizing Medicare benefits and health care areas that the program covers
and excludes).
The HCFA of the United States Department of Health and Human Services (HHS)
operates the Medicare Program. See 42 U.S.C. § 1302 (1988); 42 U.S.C. § 1395hh (1988);
42 C.F.R. Pt. 400 (1994). Medicare participants are reimbursed for services performed on a
fee-for-service basis based on the provider's cost. 42 C.F.R. § 413.5(a) (1994). Thus, all
services performed are reimbursed, limited to reasonable costs. Id.; 42 C.F.R. §§ 413.13,
.30 (1994). HCFA determines what costs are necessary for the efficient delivery of the
services rendered. 42 C.F.R. § 413.30(a)(2) (1994).
3. See HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND HUMAN SERVICES, UNITED STATES GENERAL AC-
COUNTING OFFICE, LONG-TERM CARE-OTHER COUNTRIES TIGHTEN BUDGETS WHILE
SEEKING BETrER ACCESS (1994) (concluding that fraud in the health care industry costs
federal and private insurers approximately $100 billion per year); Joel Androphy et al.,
Health Care Fraud, 33 Hous. LAW. 35 (1995) (noting that, of approximately $900 billion
spent each year on health care, 3% to 10% of that cost is related to fraud and abuse); Dana
Priest, The Road to Health Care Refbrm, WASH. POST, Jan. 26, 1993, at Health 12 (stating
that the cost of medical care is so high partially because of fraud in the Medicare system);
Becky J. Belke, Book Note, 24 Sw. U. L. REV. 501, (reviewing Jane M. Orient, M.D. YOUR
DOCTOR Is NOT IN: HEALTHY SKEPTICISM ABOUT NATIONAL HEALTH CARE (1994)) (stat-
ing that health care fraud costs private insurers, Medicare, and Medicaid approximately
$100 billion each year, or 10% of the nation's annual health care costs); Spencer Rich,
Medicare Fraud Said to Cost Hundreds of Millions: Insurers Often Fail to Refer Patients'
Complaints for Investigation, Senate Panel Is Told, WASH. POST, Oct. 3, 1991, at A21 (not-
ing that "hundreds of millions,. if not billions, of dollars" are lost to Medicare fraud each
year).
4. See Sanford V. Teplitzky et al., 1993-1994 Developments in Health Care Fraud and
Abuse, in HEALTH LAW HANDBOOK 271 (Alice G. Gosfield ed., 1995) (stating that govern-
ment initiatives addressing fraud and abuse are increasing); infra note 5 (discussing the
legislature's initiatives to combat Medicare fraud); see also Eric Pianin & John E. Yang,
House Passes Medicare Reform Bill, WASH. POST, Oct. 20, 1995, at Al, A4; infra note 10
(citing the amendment enacting Medicare anti-kickback provision); infra note 11 (provid-
ing the text of the Medicare anti-kickback statute). Within the past few years, both the
federal and state governments have made significant efforts to combat fraud. Teplitzky,
supra, at 271. In 1993, the Office of Inspector General (OIG) invoked rules identifying
business practices that were not subject to the anti-kickback provision, or "safe harbors."
Id. at 272. In 1994, the OIG clarified the "safe harbors" with the promulgation of new
rules. Id. at 278. The OIG also issued Special Fraud Alerts, delineating activities consid-
ered to be "suspect." Id. at 292. Perhaps most significantly, Congress enacted Stark II,
which prohibits a physician from referring a Medicare patient to certain designated health
care facilities in which the physician had a financial investment, providing civil penalties in
the event of a violation. Id. at 295. Stark II expands the scope Stark I, which related to
only clinical laboratories. Id.
5. See 141 CONG. REC. H13,179 (daily ed. Nov. 17, 1995) (statement of Rep. DeLay)
(noting that America cannot continue to operate as it has with waste and fraud thwarting
the government efforts to control costs and the Medicare program on the brink of bank-
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remains within these reform efforts as to whether increasing investigative
efforts or increasing criminal and civil penalties is the more effective
means of preventing fraud and abuse.6 It is generally agreed, however,
that Congress must address the problems of fraud and abuse.7
One form of Medicare fraud occurs when a physician refers patients to
facilities in which he has an ownership interest, a so called "physician self-
referral."' When the physician provides self-referrals, the compensation
ruptcy); Id. at H13,203 (statement of Rep. Kim) (stating that one of the means by which
the Republican plan intends to save the Medicare system from bankruptcy is to combat
fraud and abuse); 141 CONG. REc. H10,054 (daily ed. Oct. 13, 1995) (statement of Rep.
Tauzin) (noting that to prevent Medicare from going bankrupt, fraud, waste, and abuse
must be reduced); Clinton Affirms He Will Veto GOP's Medicare Plan, 53 CONG. Q. 3223
(1995) (President Clinton stated that fraud and abuse in the Medicare program is "a seri-
ous problem"); Colette Fraley, Historic House Medicare Vote Affirms GOP Determination,
53 CONG. Q. 3206 (1995) (stating that the hospital insurance trust fund would-be bankrupt
by the year 2002 and that Republicans believe the bill the House passed on October 19,
1995 saved the Medicare program from this ultimate fate). For the text of a recent Medi-
care reform bill, see H.R. 2425, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995) (proposing to restore the
financial stability of Medicare).
6. On October 19, 1995, the House of Representatives passed a bill which, if enacted,
would impose treble damages on a person who violated the anti-kickback provision. 141
CONG. REC. H10,450 (daily ed. Oct. 19, 1995) (discussing H.R. 2485). Additionally, H.R.
2485 would permit the court to impose a community service obligation on the offender. Id.
In opposition to this bill, one member of the House argued that increasing the penalty is
not a sufficient deterrent when the budget of the Inspector General, who enforces the
provision, is decreased. See id. at H10,453 (statement of Rep. Dingell) (stating that the
Democrats believe that the Republican bill, which reduces the budget of the Inspector
General of the Department of Health and Human Services, eliminates protection against
fraud and abuse that the statute mandates); cf. id. at H10,454 (statement of Rep. Stupak)
(noting Republican efforts to combat fraud and abuse through the imposition of greater
fines); see also Medicare Integrity Bill is Flawed, Says HHS Inspector General, MEALEY'S
LITIGATION REPORT, Oct. 25,1995, at 12 (noting that the Inspector General of the Depart-
ment of Health and Human Services is troubled by the potential for the Medicare Integrity
Bill, H.R. 2389, to weaken the ability to control Medicare fraud). The Inspector General
expressed concern that the new bill raises the burden of proof in fraud cases from a show-
ing that inducing referrals was one purpose of the remuneration scheme to showing that
inducing referrals was the significant purpose of the scheme. Id.
7. See Teplitzky, supra note 4, at 271 (noting that every health care reform proposal
introduced in 1993-1994 addressed the issues of fraud and abuse).
8. Jennifer Puryear, Comment, The Physician as Entrepreneur: State and Federal Re-
strictions on Physician Joint Ventures, 73 N.C. L. REv. 293, 294 (1994); see also Hanlester
Network v. Shalala, 51 F.3d 1390, 1396 (9th Cir. 1995) (noting that this case was the first
time physician self-referral joint ventures have been prosecuted under the anti-kickback
provision). The anti-kickback provision prohibits referrals to facilities not owned by the
referring physician as well, if the referral is in exchange for remuneration. See, e.g., United
States v. Bay State Ambulance and Hosp. Rental Serv., 874 F.2d 20, 30-31 (1st Cir. 1989)
(holding that cash and a car given to a hospital executive by a private ambulatory service in
exchange for an ambulance service contract, although reasonable compensation for serv-
ices, constituted an inducement in violation of the anti-kickback statute); United States v.
Greber, 760 F.2d 68, 72 (3d Cir.) (concluding that paying the referring physician a percent-
age of monies received from Medicare for diagnostic monitoring service was a violation of
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received from the entity in which the physician maintains a financial in-
terest may be in the form of "kickbacks" to the referring physician in
exchange for his referrals of Medicare patients.9 The anti-kickback provi-
sion of the Social Security Act is intended to prevent fraud and abuse in
the Medicare reimbursement system.1" This provision makes it illegal to
"knowingly and willfully" solicit or offer kickbacks in return for these
the anti-kickback statute), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 988 (1985); United States v. Hancock, 604
F.2d 999, 1001 (7th Cir.) (holding that fees paid to chiropractors in exchange for referring
blood tests to laboratories were "kickbacks"), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 991 (1979); Polk
County v. Peters, 800 F. Supp. 1451, 1456 (E.D. Tex. 1992) (holding that a hospital's physi-
cian recruitment program violated the anti-kickback statute because it induced those phy-
sicians to refer their patients to that hospital).
This Comment focuses on the anti-kickback provision as it relates to physician self-refer-
ral arrangements. Physician self-referrals, or referrals of Medicare patients to facilities in
which the referring physician has an ownership interest, are not per se violations of the
anti-kickback provision. See Hanlester, 51 F.3d at 1396 (noting that nothing in the lan-
guage of the anti-kickback provision prohibits joint ventures). There is a concern, how-
ever, that self-referrals promote fraud because they create an incentive for doctors to refer
Medicare patients to their facilities for unnecessary services. See Puryear, supra, at 300
(stating that studies show that physicians with an ownership interest in a facility more fre-
quently refer patients to the facility for services than physicians without an interest). An-
other concern is that physicians with an ownership interest in a facility will restrict a
patient's choice of facilities. See Androphy, supra note 3, at 37 (listing "steering," the
elimination of a patient's freedom to choose a facility, as a common scheme that the anti-
kickback statute curbed).
One of the important aspects of the Hanlester decision is its holding that while the
financial relationship itself is not illegal, it is a violation of the anti-kickback provision
when that relationship induces the remuneration. 51 F.3d at 1398. Therefore, the fact that
the number of referrals affects the return on investment, without more, is insufficient to
constitute a violation of the anti-kickback provision. Id. at 1399.
9. See Greber, 760 F.2d at 71 (noting that there is concern regarding the practice of
giving "kickbacks" to encourage the referral of Medicare patients). As the court in Greber
noted, United States Attorneys testified before the congressional committee, stating that
"'physicians often determine which laboratories would do the test work for their medicaid
patients by the amount of the kickbacks and rebates offered by the laboratory .... Kick-
backs take a number of forms including cash, long-term credit arrangements, gifts, supplies
and equipment, and the furnishing of business machines.'" Id. (quoting H.R. REP. No.
393, 95 Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 2, at 53, reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3039, 3048-3049); see
also Puryear, supra note 8, at 298 (noting that profits to referring physicians resemble
kickbacks); John J. Farley, Note, The Medicare Antifraud Statute and Safe Harbor Regula-
tions: Suggestions for Change, 81 GEO. L. J. 167, 169 (1992) (discussing how physicians
profit from Medicare by receiving financial incentives for referring Medicare patients to a
certain health care facility).
10. See Social Security Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-603, § 242(b)-(c), 86 Stat.
1329, 1419-20 (current version codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1320a-7b, 1395nn (1988)); see also
Androphy, supra note 3, at 35 (stating that Congress has enacted and amended several
statutes to deal with fraud); Farley, supra note 9, at 168-71 (noting that Congress enacted
the anti-kickback provision to prevent fraud and abuse in the Medicare system); Puryear,
supra note 8, at 303 (noting that the Social Security Act was amended in 1972 to include
the "Anti-Fraud Statute" in order to deal with the abuses of the Medicare program); infra
note 11 (providing the text of the Medicare anti-kickback statute).
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referrals."
The definition of the term knowingly and willfully has been unclear in
many areas of criminal law,12 including Medicare fraud.13 Courts have
struggled for years with the interpretation of statutes that contain a re-
quirement that the act be committed knowingly or willfully. The issue is
whether the prosecutor must prove that the defendant consciously and
intentionally committed the act or whether the defendant knew the act
was in violation of the law.
14
11. The anti-kickback statute provides as follows:
(b) Illegal remunerations.
(1) Whoever knowingly and willfully solicits or receives any remuneration
(including any kickback, bribe, or rebate) directly or indirectly, overtly or
covertly, in cash or in kind-
(A) in return for referring an individual to a person for the furnishing
or arranging for the furnishing of any item or service for which payment
may be made in whole or in part under Subchapter XVIII [42 U.S.C.
§§ 1395-1395ccc] of this chapter or a State health care program, or
(B) in return for purchasing, leasing, ordering, or arranging for or rec-
ommending purchasing, leasing, or ordering any good, facility, service,
or item for which payment may be made in whole or in part under Sub-
chapter XVIII of this chapter or a State health care program, shall be
guilty of a felony and upon conviction thereof, shall be fined not more
than $25,000 or imprisoned for not more than five years, or both.
(2) Whoever knowingly and willfully offers or pays any remuneration (in-
cluding any kickback, bribe, or rebate) directly or indirectly, overtly or co-
vertly, in cash or in kind to any person to induce such person-
(A) to refer an individual to a person for the furnishing or arranging
for the furnishing of any item or service for which payment may be made
in whole or in part under subchapter XVIII of this chapter or a State
health program, or
(B) to purchase, lease, or arrange for or recommend purchasing, leas-
ing, or ordering any good, facility, service, or item for which payment
may be made in whole or in part under Subchapter XVIII of this chapter
or a State health care program, shall be guilty of a felony...
42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(b) (1988 & Supp. V 1993) (emphasis added).
12. See Spies v. United States, 317 U.S. 492, 497 (1943) (characterizing the term "will-
ful" as a "word of many meanings" and determining its meaning for purposes of tax law);
see also Ratzlaf v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 655, 662 (1994) (determining the meaning of
the word "willfully" for purposes of currency restructuring); Liparota v. United States, 471
U.S. 419, 426 (1985) (interpreting the term "knowingly" for purposes of the statute regulat-
ing food stamp fraud); United States v. Hayden, 64 F.3d 126, 131 (3d Cir. 1995) (determin-
ing the meaning of the term "willfully" as used in the statute regulating a felon's use of
firearms).
13. See Hanlester Network v. Shalala, 51 F.3d 1390, 1399 n.16 (9th Cir. 1995) (looking
to the legislative history of 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b to clarify the term "knowingly and will-
fully"); Laura Ariane Miller, The Element of Intent in 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(b): An Uncer-
tain Standard in a Sea of Uncertainty, 2-3 (1995) (unpublished manuscript, on file with The
Catholic University Law Review) (noting that it is unclear whether one must merely intend
the result or whether one must intend to violate the law).
14. See Ratzlaf, 114 S. Ct. at 659 (stating that the meaning of the word "willful" is
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In Hanlester Network v. Shalala,15 the United States Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit defined the term knowingly and willfully for pur-
poses of the anti-kickback provision of the Social Security Act as requir-
ing a "specific intent to disobey the law.",16 This was the first case to
often "influenced by its context"); United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394, 403 (1980) (noting
that "[flew areas of criminal law pose more difficulty than the proper definition of the
[state of mind] required for any particular crime"). See generally John F. Cooney, Defenses
to the Second Generation of Environmental Criminal Prosecutions, in CRIMINAL ENFORCE-
MENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAWS 39, 41 (ALI-ABA Course of Study Materials 1994) (ad-
vocating that recent complex environmental legislation justifies a departure from the
application of the public welfare offense doctrine, where defendants are presumed to know
the law); Steve Brantley, Note, Ratzlaf v. United States: Sometimes Ignorance of the Law is
an Excuse, 45 MERCER L. REV. 1465, 1473 (1994) (noting that there are several definitions
of the term "willfulness," and, as a result of Ratzlaf, courts are more likely to look at the
context of the term used in the statute to determine its meaning).
15. 51 F.3d 1390 (9th Cir. 1995).
16. Id. at 1400. This case involved a joint venture between the Hanlester Network, a
partnership, and three clinical laboratories, each of which were limited partnerships. Id. at
1394. Hanlester offered limited partnership shares in these laboratories to physician inves-
tors. Id. The evidence showed that Hanlester encouraged the limited partners to refer
business to the laboratories, although they were not paid based on ownership interest nor
were they compensated based upon the volume of their referrals. Id. at 1399. Smithkline
BioScience Laboratories (SKBL) entered into agreements with the laboratories to service
their administrative and operational tasks. Id. at 1394-95. SKBL, which decided whether
tests would be performed on-site or at one of the three reference laboratories, was paid the
greater of a fixed fee or 80% of the laboratories' collections. Id. at 1395. SKBL performed
85% to 90% of tests ordered from the Hanlester labs, with the Hanlester laboratories
performing the remainder themselves. Id. The Department of Health and Human Serv-
ices notified Hanlester that it had violated the anti-kickback provision of the Social Secur-
ity Act by offering to pay remunerations to physician investors to induce them to refer
their patients to the laboratories in which they had an ownership interest and by soliciting
and receiving remunerations from SKBL for referrals of laboratory tests. Id.
The Ninth Circuit considered whether the anti-kickback provision applied to physician
self-referral joint ventures. Id. at 1396. The court first addressed whether the physician
and the entity must have an explicit agreement to refer Medicare-related business in order
to violate the statute. Id. at 1396-97. Deciding that an agreement to refer Medicare pa-
tients was not necessary to violate the statute, the court concluded that there must be an
inducement, which requires an attempt to condition remunerations upon referrals. Id. at
1398. The court also looked at whether the anti-kickback provision was too vague to pro-
vide fair warning of illegal conduct. Id. at 1397-98. The court noted that the conduct must
be knowing and willful. Id. at 1398. Thus, the statute requires that the defendant actually
understand that he or she disobeyed the law, and, therefore, mitigates any vagueness. Id.
The court concluded that the anti-kickback provision was not unconstitutionally vague. Id.
The court further held that joint ventures did not per se violate the statute. Id. at 1399.
Concluding that it was not illegal to encourage limited partners to refer business to the
laboratories and offer physicians profits that were indirectly related to the referrals, the
court noted that it was illegal to imply that the return on investment was directly related to
the referrals. Id. Finally, the court held that the term knowingly and willfully, as applied
to the anti-kickback statute, required knowledge of the law and specific intent to disobey
that law. Id. at 1400; see also W. Bradley Tully & Patric Hooper, Hanlester Network: An
Initial Assessment, 4 HEALTH L. REP. (BNA) 847 (1995) (analyzing the case and its
implications).
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define the term in the context of the anti-kickback provision.17 Because
it is the only case to define the term as used in this statute, it remains
unclear whether other courts will follow Hanlester.
That terms such as knowingly and willfully have not been defined con-
sistently is somewhat surprising, 8 because criminal law statutes use these
terms frequently.19 Because the terms easily could be given a clear defi-
nition, perhaps the legislature and the courts desire to keep them ambigu-
ous to permit flexible application of the statute in light of the specific
Hanlester is significant because it stands for the proposition that offering the potential
for profit in exchange for referrals is not per se illegal. Id. at 848. It is when the offer of
remunerations in exchange for referrals effects the physician's judgment that the statute is
violated. Id. Additionally, the Hanlester decision does not affect restrictions imposed by
the Stark laws or state law. Id. at 849; see infra note 38 (discussing the Stark laws). Fur-
thermore, the defendant's good-faith belief that his conduct is not illegal is a complete
defense under the anti-kickback provision as a result of Hanlester, regardless of whether
the belief is reasonable. Tully & Hooper, supra, at 849. Interestingly, the HHS has de-
cided not to file a petition for certiorari to the Supreme Court. News at Deadline, MOD-
ERN HEALTHCARE, Feb. 12, 1996, at 4.
17. See Miller, supra note 13, at 3 (noting that, before Hanlester was decided, no case
law discussed the application of "knowingly and willfully" in the context of the anti-kick-
back statute). Although not decided upon, the definiton of the term willfully in context of
the anti-kickback provision was addressed in dicta in the Southern District of Ohio.
United States v. Neufeld, 908 F. Supp. 491 (S.D. Ohio 1995). In Neufeld, the court ex-
pressly rejected Hanlester's application of Ratzlaf to the definition of the word willfully.
Id. at 497. While not providing an alternative definition, the court stated that there is no
evidence from the language of the statute or legislative history that the term willfully re-
quires proof of knowledge of the law. Id. at 495-97. Unlike in the currency structuring
statute addressed in Ratzlaf, an interpretation of the word willfully as requiring other than
knowledge of the law would not deem other terms superfluous. Id. at 496. Additionally,
accepting kickbacks is inherently evil and, thus, does not require a legal standard that pro-
tects a defendant who did not have an evil motive. Id. Finally, the legislative history shows
Congress' concern that inadvertant actors will be prosecuted. Id. However, the District
Court in Neufeld argues, a requirement that the prosecutor show that the defendant know
the law is not required to prevent that result. Id.
18. See generally Karen M. Hansen, "Knowing" Environmental Crimes, 16 WM.
MITCHELL L. REV. 987, 989 (1990) (commenting that although the term knowingly is seem-
ingly straightforward, courts in defining the mental state required by that word have ap-
plied several meanings); Miguel Angel M6ndez, A Sisyphean Task: The Common Law
Approach To Mens Rea, 28 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 407 (1995) (stating that because conviction
and punishment depend upon proof of mental state, one would expect that the legislature
and courts would define mental state precisely); Rachael Simonoff, Ratzlaf v. United
States: The Meaning of "Willful" and the Demands of Due Process, 28 COLUM. J.L. & Soc.
PROBS. 397 (1995) (explaining that despite the fact that "willfully" is one of the most com-
mon culpability requirements in statutory offenses, it is recognized as ambiguous).
19. See Bart. M. Schwartz, Mens Rea: An Introduction, and A Particular View of The
Securities, and Tax Laws, in MENs REA-STATE OF MIND DEFENSES IN CRIMINAL AND
CIVIL FRAUD CASES 127, 131-36 (PLI Litig. & Admin. Practice Course Handbook Series
No. 140, 1985) (listing the terms used to describe the requisite mental state in various
provisions of Title 18, where most federal criminal statutes are found; thirty-seven sections
contain some derivative of the words "willfully," "knowingly," or both).
Catholic University Law Review [Vol. 45:943
circumstances of a particular case."
This Comment discusses the definition of the term knowingly and will-
fully as applied to the anti-kickback provision of the Social Security Act.
First, this Comment studies the Social Security Act itself, tracing its de-
velopment, its language, and its legislative history. Next, this Comment
examines both case law addressing the definition of the term knowingly
and willfully in the context of other statutes and case law specifically ad-
dressing the anti-kickback provision. This Comment focuses on the stat-
utes that require the mens rea element of knowingly and willfully and
compares those statutes to the anti-kickback provision. It analyzes
whether the term should require knowledge of the unlawfulness of the act
or simply consciousness of the act itself. This Comment reviews the
Hanlester decision and applies the facts of that case to the law applied to
other statutes with similar mens rea language. Finally, this Comment ex-
amines the consequences of applying a particular definition of the term
knowingly and willfully on the health care industry and business relation-
ships in general. This Comment concludes that the Hanlester court's ap-
proach-requiring proof of knowledge of the law-is legally sound and
consistent with public policy.
I. THE ANTI-KICKBACK PROVISION-ITS DEVELOPMENT, GROWTH,
AND IMPACT
A. Statutory Development-The Legislature's Concern for Fraud
Medicare is bifurcated into programs serving different purposes.2'
20. There is concern that the general rule that ignorance of the law is no excuse is a
severe interpretation for some modern crimes. See, e.g., Cheek v. United States, 498 U.S.
192, 199-200 (1991) (noting that tax law is so complex that those who violate the law in
good faith should not be punished); United States v. Baker, 63 F.3d 1478, 1491 (9th Cir.
1995) (stating that an exception to the general rule that ignorance of the law is no excuse
should be made for complex regulatory schemes that could result in the punishment of
inadvertent violators), cert. denied, 64 U.S.L.W. 3502 (1996); United States v. Lizarraga-
Lizarraga, 541 F.2d 826, 828-29 (9th Cir. 1976) (holding that, as it is unclear from the
statute what types of ammunition may not be exported from the country, apparently inno-
cent conduct could be punished unless the prosecution is required to prove the defendant
violated a known legal duty); Simonoff, supra note 18, at 407 (stating that not permitting
the defense of ignorance of the law leads to a harsh result when applied to regulatory
crimes not inherently immoral). Historically, common law crimes were based on immoral
conduct. Id. It was logical, therefore, to punish an immoral act regardless of whether the
actor knew it was illegal. Id. Today, however, many crimes, especially regulatory crimes,
are not based on morality. Id. These crimes may not give fair warning and notice to the
actor that his act is illegal. Id. To avoid the harsh result of punishing an actor who did not
have notice that an act ,was criminal, courts have abandoned the general rule that one is
assumed to know the law. Id. Instead, for a defendant to be guilty of a crime, the prosecu-
tion must show that the defendant knew the act was illegal. Id.
21. See 70A AM. JUR. 2D Social Security and Medicare § 450 (1987) (noting that Part
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Medicare Part A, funded by social security taxes, provides for hospital
care and post-operative hospital services.22 Medicare Part B, which the
federal government subsidizes, provides 80% coverage of doctor's visits,
lab tests, and equipment.23 Because of the system's magnitude and the
lack of effective controls, 24 allegations of fraud and abuse have become
prevalent.25 To address this problem, Congress has enacted and amended
several statutes over the past few decades.26 Despite attempts at statu-
tory solutions, fraud and abuse continue to be a costly problem.27
A Medicare provides hospital insurance benefits and Part B Medicare provides other
health care benefits).
22. 42 U.S.C. § 1395c-1395i (1988 & Supp. V 1993). Part A covers necessary inpatient
hospital costs, limited skilled nursing facilities, home health care if the beneficiary needs
care on a less than full-time basis, and hospice care if the patient is expected to die within
six months. See Androphy, supra note 3, at 35 (explaining the bifurcated Medicare sys-
tem); Jimenez, supra note 1, at 119 (outlining the Medicare program).
23. 42 U.S.C. § 1395j-1395w (1988 & Supp. V 1993); see also 42 C.F.R. §§ 410.3,410.10
to .68 (providing regulations addressing services covered by Part B). Part B covers physi-
cians' services, outpatient hospital services, physical and occupational therapy, speech pa-
thology services, durable medical equipment, supplies and prosthetic devices, ambulance
services, clinical laboratory tests and treatments, and outpatient psychiatric services. Id. at
§ 410.10; see Androphy, supra note 3, at 35 (discussing subsidized medical insurance);
Jimenez, supra note 1 (giving an overview of Medicare services).
24. See Randal R. Bovbjerg, Competition Versus Regulation in Medical Care. An Over-
drawn Dichotomy, 34 VAND. L. REV. 965, 970 (1981) (discussing the lack of controls over
health care costs due to the incentive to pay costs incurred rather than necessary costs);
Pamela H. Bucy, Fraud by Fright: White Collar Crime by Health Care Providers, 67 N.C. L.
REV. 855, 864 (1989) (recognizing that the Medicare fee-for-service system could serve as
an incentive for doctors to provide more services); David A. Hyman & Joel V. Williamson,
Fraud and Abuse: Regulatory Alternatives in a "Competitive" Health Care Era, 19 Loy. U.
CHI. L.J. 1133, 1134-35 (1988) (noting that the fee-for-service reimbursement system re-
wards physicians who provide inefficient health care).
25. Androphy, supra note 3, at 35; see also Gil Klein, Medicare Fraud Goes Un-
checked, TAMPA TRIB., Nov. 4, 1995, at Nation/World 4 (noting that Medicare fraud is
prevalent and easy to commit under the current structure of the program); cf William
Raspberry, Numbers That Won't Go Away, WASH. POST, Jan. 26,1996, at A23 (noting that
Bob Packwood believes that fighting fraud and abuse in programs such as Medicare, Medi-
caid, and Social Security will not assist in balancing the nation's budget, because the Social
Security program is one of the "cleanest and most efficient programs in the entire govern-
ment"); see also supra notes 5-11 and accompanying text (discussing the problem of fraud
and abuse).
26. Androphy, supra note 3, at 35-36; see infra notes 27-40 and accompanying text
(discussing the development of the legislative respohse to Medicare fraud).
27. See David S. Nalven, Medicare and Medicaid Fraud: an Enforcement Priority for
the 1990s, BOSTON B.J., Sept.-Oct. 1994, at 9 (discussing the government's aggressive
stance on fighting Medicare fraud). Governmental measures to fight fraud include prose-
cution by the Department of Justice; exclusion from the Medicare program by the Office of
Inspector General; legislation, such as the criminal sanctions under the anti-fraud and
abuse provisions of the Social Security Act, and civil penalties Under the False Claims Act;
and administrative fines imposed by the HHS. Id. at 9-10; see generally, Graham Stafford,
Medicare and Medicaid Fraud and Abuse, in PROFESSIONAL CORPORATIONS AND SMALL
BUSINESSES AFTER THE TAX REFORM AcT OF 1984 253 (PLI Tax Law & Estate Planning
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The Social Security Act prohibits making false statements and misrep-
resentations of material facts related to requirements under the Act, clas-
sifying such violations as misdemeanors.28 In 1972, Congress amended
the statute to prohibit the solicitation, offering, or receipt of kickbacks,
bribes, or rebates as well.29 The amendment, however, continued to
classify such wrongdoings as misdemeanors.3" In 1977, Congress enacted
the Medicare Anti-Fraud and Abuse Statute, making it a felony to solicit,
receive, or offer remunerations in return for Medicare patient referrals.31
Course Handbook Series No. 216, 1984) (proposing the means by which the government
can fight health care fraud).
28. 42 U.S.C. § 1307(a) (1988).
29. Social Security Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-603, § 242(b),(c), 86 Stat.
1329, 1419 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b (1988 & Supp. V 1993)); see also
Hanlester Network v. Shalala, 51 F.3d 1390, 1396 n.7 (9th Cir. 1995) (pointing out that the
1972 amendment was limited to kickbacks, bribes, or rebates, whereas the law currently
applies to any remunerations); Puryear, supra note 8, at 303 (discussing the statute).
30. § 242(b),(c), 86 Stat. at 1419.
31. Medicare-Medicaid Anti-Fraud and Abuse Amendments, Pub. L. No. 95-142, 91
Stat. 1175, 1182 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b (1988 & Supp. V 1993)).
This amendment redefined the crime from a misdemeanor to a felony, Hanlester Network
v. Shalala, 51 F.3d 1390, 1396 (9th Cir. 1995), in response to a concern over increased fraud
in the health care industry:
[T]here exist[s], to a disturbing degree, fraudulent and abusive practices associ-
ated with the provision of health services financed by the medicare and medicaid
programs.... [F]raud in these health care financing programs adversely impacts
on all Americans. It cheats taxpayers who must ultimately bear the financial bur-
den of misuse of funds in any government-sponsored program. It diverts from
those most in need, the nation's elderly and poor, scarce program dollars that
were intended to provide vitally needed quality health services. The wasting of
program funds through fraud also further erodes the financial stability of those
state and local governments whose budgets are already overextended and who
must commit an ever-increasing portion of their financial resources to fulfill the
obligations of their medical assistance programs.
H.R. REP. No. 393, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 2, at 44-45 (1977), reprinted in 1977
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3039, 3047.
Congress was concerned that physicians would over-utilize the Medicare program by
ordering unnecessary medical services for Medicare patients because they are motivated by
the incentive of receiving profits for referrals to health care facilities in which the physi-
cians have a financial interest. See Farley, supra note 9, at 179 (noting studies show that
when a physician has a financial interest in a facility they refer more patients for tests,
indicating that patients undergo unnecessary procedures); Amy L. Woodhall, Note, Inte-
grated Delivery Systems: Reforming the Conflicts Among Federal Referral, Tax Exemption,
and Antitrust Laws, 5 HEALTH MATRIX 181, 188 (1995) (noting that one of the anti-kick-
back provision's purposes was to prevent over-utilization). Unnecessary services may be
ordered when physicians are enticed by kickbacks, thereby unnecessarily increasing Medi-
care costs. Id. Remunerations also may interfere with competition and distort medical
costs. Id.; cf. Farley, supra note 9, at 175-79 (arguing that physician investments in health
care facilities increase efficiency in providing health care, permit full response to changes in
the health care marketplace, and provide motivation for providing high quality services
because the doctor has a financial interest in the facility). Physicians motivated by kick-
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The Anti-Fraud and Abuse statute resulted from Congress' belief that
penalties under the 1972 amendment remained insufficient to deter illegal
practices. 32 Furthermore, Congress found the 1972 amendment too am-
biguous and added language clarifying the definition of illegal behavior.33
To ensure that those acting inadvertently were not held criminally lia-
ble, Congress further amended the law in 1980 to require that only viola-
tions committed "knowingly and willfully" be unlawful.34 In 1987,
Congress added a provision under which persons convicted of crimes re-
lated to the delivery of an item or service under the Medicare program
may be prohibited from participating in the program. 35 Therefore, physi-
cians participating in prohibited business ventures may be unable to ac-
cept patients covered by Medicare. To clarify which business ventures
were legal and which were prohibited under 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(b),
Congress mandated the Secretary of Health and Human Services to de-
velop "safe harbor regulations" defining activities permitted under the
anti-kickback provision.36 Most recently, Congress enacted The Ethics in
backs may interfere with a patient's choice of physicians or facilities because the physicians
refer patients to facilities in which the physician has a financial interest, rather than to
facilities with the highest quality care or that are convenient for the patient. Woodhall,
supra at 188; see supra note 8 and accompanying text (discussing concerns regarding physi-
cian self-referrals).
32. See H.R. REP. No. 393, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 2, at 53 (1977), reprinted in 1977
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3039, 3055 (noting that studies concluded that misdemeanor penalties were
insufficient to deter Medicare and Medicaid providers from illegal activities). The House
Report further noted that current misdemeanor penalties were inconsistent with other stat-
utes, which punished similar behavior as felonies. Id.
33. Id. at 3055-56 (stating that the existing statute was unclear as to what behavior was
illegal). The bill intended to clarify behavior and financial arrangements that fell under the
statute. The legislative history stated:
[The bill] would make subject to the penalty provisions any person who solicits or
receives any remuneration (1) in return for referring an individual to a person for
the furnishing, or arranging for the furnishing of items or services; or (2) in return
for purchasing, leasing, or ordering, or arranging for or recommending the
purchasing, leasing, or ordering of goods, facilities, or services. ...
The bill would define the term "any remuneration" broadly to encompass kick-
backs, bribes, or rebates which may be made directly or indirectly, overtly or
covertly, in cash or in kind (but would exclude any amount paid by an employer
to an employee for employment in the provision of covered items or services).
Id. at 3056.
34. Omnibus Reconciliation Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-499, § 917, 94 Stat. 2599, 2625
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(b) (1988 & Supp. V 1993)); see H.R. REP.
No. 1167, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 59 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5526, 5572 (clari-
fying the law to "assure that only persons who knowingly and willfully engage in the pro-
scribed conduct could be subject to criminal sanctions").
35. Medicare and Medicaid Patient and Program Protection Act of 1987, Pub. L. No.
100-93, § 1128, 101 Stat 680, 680-81 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(a)(5)
(1988 & Supp. 1993)).
36. § 14, 101 Stat at 697. For exceptions to conduct prohibited by the anti-kickback
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Patient Referrals Act ("Stark I") 3' and The Comprehensive Physician
Ownership and Referral Act of 1993 ("Stark 11').38 Stark I prohibits
physicians from referring Medicare patients to clinical laboratories in
which the physician has an ownership interest.39 Stark II expands the
provision that developed as a result of that mandate, see 42 C.F.R. § 1001.952 (a)-(m)
(1994). These safe harbor regulations permit payments that constitute a return on invest-
ment, rental payments for space and equipment, payments made to an agent for services,
sale of a practitioner's practice to another practitioner, payments to referral services, pay-
ments or exchanges made under warranty, certain discounts, amounts paid by an employer
to an employee for services, amounts paid by a vendor to a group purchasing organization,
waiver of coinsurance and deductible amounts, additional coverage from another health
plan and price reductions offered by a health care provider to a health plan. Id. All of
these safe harbors are subject to certain restrictions. Id.; see also Androphy, supra note 3,
at 39 (explaining the purpose of safe harbors as guidelines for doctors to ensure legality of
business arrangements and to close loopholes in the statutes); Puryear, supra note 8, at
306-08 (discussing types of safe harbors and the corresponding requirements). Effective
January, 1996, Congress amended the safe harbor regulations to provide a more-inclusive
definition of "health plan" and to provide guidelines for health care providers and health
plans where the health care provider is paid on an at-risk basis. Medicare and State Health
Care Programs: Fraud and Abuse; Safe Harbors for Protecting Health Plans, 61 Fed. Reg.
2122-37 (1996) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. § 100i.952).
37. Ethics in Patient Referrals Act, enacted as part of Omnibus Budget Reconciliation
Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-239, § 6204, 103 Stat. 2106, 2236-43 (codified as amended at
42 U.S.C. § 1395nn (Supp. V 1993)).
38. Comprehensive Physician Ownership and Referral Act of 1993, enacted as part of
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-66, § 13,562, 107 Stat. 312,
569 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1395nn (Supp. V 1993)); see Puryear, supra note 8, at 310-13.
Stark I and Stark II are named after the author, Representative Fortney H. "Pete" Stark
(D-Calif), former Chairman of the House Ways and Means Subcommittee on Health. See
Lisa M. Rockelli, Physician Groups Take Opportunity to Lobby For Changes to Stark I
Law, 4 HEALTH L. REP. (BNA) 277, 278 (1995) (noting that the goal of Stark II is to limit
the over-utilization of services by physicians who refer patients to facilities in which they
have an ownership interest). Congressman Stark initiated the "Stark laws" to prohibit
abusive arrangements and to provide clear rules for health care providers to follow. Leslie
J. Gold, HCFA Issues Final Rule, Seeks Comments on Stark I Clinical Lab Service Refer-
rals, 4 HEALTH L. REP. (BNA) 1245, 1246 (1995). The goal of clarity, however, has not
been accomplished. Id.; see infra notes 39-40 (discussing the provisions and problems of
the "Stark laws"); see also infra note 54 (discussing the differences between the anti-kick-
back provision and the Stark laws). For a-general discussion of the Stark law, its provi-
sions, and its application, see Richard A. Blacker, "Stark" Law's Definitions Restrict Group
Practices, NAT. L.J., Jan. 22, 1996, at B8.
39. § 6204, 103 Stat. at 2236 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1395nn (Supp. V
1993)). Stark I, prohibiting the referrals of Medicare patients to clinical laboratories by
physicians with a financial interest in those laboratories, became effective on January 1,
1992. Id. at 2242. There are several exceptions to this provision: the "personal services"
exception (permitting a physician to refer a patient to a clinic in which he owns an interest
if he provides or supervises the service); the "large corporation" exception (permitting self-
referral in certain publicly-held corporations); and the "rural area" exception (allowing a
physician to self-refer to a clinic in a rural area). 42 U.S.C. § 1395nn(b)-(d) (Supp. V
1993); see also Puryear, supra note 8, at 308-10 (explaining Stark I and its exceptions).
Effective September, 1995, the Health Care Financing Administration implemented regu-
lations addressing Stark I. Physician Financial Relationships with, and Referrals to Health
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prohibition against self-referral to additional health care services.4 °
Care Entities, 60 Fed. Reg. 41,914 (1995) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. § 411.355-61). These
regulations explain further the exceptions articulated in the legislation. See Gold, supra
note 38, at 1245 (discussing the regulations and the exceptions of Stark I).
40. § 13562, 107 Stat. at 596 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1395nn (Supp. V 1993)). Stark II
explicitly prohibits physicians from making referrals to designated health care facilities in
which the physician maintains a financial interest. Id. § 1395nn(a)(1)(A). Exceptions are
made if the physician, or a member of his group practice, personally provides the services,
id. § 1395nn(b)(1), if services are performed by the physician or another physician who is a
member of the same group practice and in the same building in which the referring physi-
cian furnishes other unrelated services, id. § 1395nn(b)(2)(A), if the services are performed
in accordance with designated prepaid plans, id. § 1395nn(b)(3), or in other situations de-
termined by the Secretary "not [to] pose a risk of program or patient abuse." Id.
§ 1395nn(b)(4). Designated health care services include clinical laboratories; physical ther-
apy; occupational therapy; radiology; radiation therapy; durable medical equipment; par-
enteral and enteral nutrients, equipment, and supplies; prosthetics, orthotics, and
prosthetic devices; home health services; outpatient prescription drugs; and inpatient and
outpatient hospital services. Id. § 1395nn(h)(6). A violation of this law results in denial of
payment by Medicare or Medicaid. Id. § 1395nn(g)(1). Stark II expanded Stark I's efforts
to prohibit self-referrals by including additional health care services and broadening its
applicability to Medicaid as well as Medicare. Gold, supra note 38, at 1245; see also
Puryear, supra note 8, at 310-12 (discussing Stark II and its exceptions).
This amendment significantly effects joint ventures and other investments because, cur-
rently, most investments in medical facilities would violate Stark II if the physician makes
self-referrals. Puryear, supra note 8, at 313. Therefore, existing investments will be forced
to dissolve to avoid violating the statute. Id.
Stark II affects only Medicare and Medicaid patients and does not include patients in-
sured by private sources. Id.; see also Rockelli, supra note 38, at 278 (noting that physi-
cians are prohibited from referring Medicare and Medicaid patients for certain services to
health care facilities in which the referring physician has an ownership interest). As a
result, the ultimate effect of Stark II may be to induce health care providers to refuse to
treat patients covered by these programs. See generally Farley, supra note 9, at 167-68
(discussing the economic efficiency of physicians investing in medical facilities, and poten-
tial for self-referrals being a consequence of this competitive progression in health care).
A physician violates Stark II merely by entering into a financial relationship with a facil-
ity and making referrals of Medicare and Medicaid patients to that facility for designated
services. Lisa M. Rockelli, HCFA, IG Refuse "Stark II" Moratorium But Hold Off on
Reporting Requirements, 4 HEALTH L. REP. (BNA) 189 (1995). The physician's intent is
irrelevant. Id. This imposition of strict liability is frustrating to health care providers be-
cause the law is ambiguous. See id. at 189-90 (noting that the HCFA's warning to physi-
cians to consult legal advice if he has questions about the law" 'reflects on the difficulty of
writing regulations for such a complex statute' "); id. at 190 (noting that most of the excep-
tions granted in Stark II have various limitations and conditions, making it necessary to
read the full statute to understand it) (quoting John Steiner, assistant general counsel for
AHA); see also infra note 54 (discussing the ambiguities in the anti-kickback provision).
The exceptions under the law are considered "critical but confusing." Rockelli, supra at
190. The result of imposing strict liability on an ambiguous statute is that it will not be
enforced aggressively. Id.
Opponents of Stark II believe it is too restrictive on the delivery and financing of health
care. Physician Groups To Seek Repeal of Major Stark II Restrictions, 4 HEALTH L. REP.
(BNA) 650 (1995). The consequence of Stark II is to micro-manage the formation of
health care networks. Id. at 651. Stark II, it is argued, should be amended to be more
19961
Catholic University Law Review [Vol. 45:943
B. Judicial Interpretation of the Anti-kickback Provision
"Knowingly and willfully" generally means consciously and intention-
ally.4' Whether one must know and intend to act or know and intend to
violate the law is unclear,42 however, as the courts' interpretation of these
terms has varied.43 The Model Penal Code defines the term knowingly as
requiring the defendant to be aware of his conduct or be aware that the
conduct will cause a particular result.44 Boiler-plate jury instructions de-
fine the word knowingly as being conscious and aware of one's actions
and not acting in "ignorance, mistake or accident.",45 Under the Model
sensitive to the health care market, while still addressing the concerns Stark I was initiated
to address. Id. Proponents of the law argue that its purpose is to prevent over-utilization
of the system, and that studies show that over-utilization occurs when physicians have a
financial interest in the facility to which they refer patients. Id. Stark II apparently has not
reached a balance between permitting the market to provide health care services and
preventing Medicare and Medicaid abuse. See generally Rockelli, supra note 38, at 277-79
(discussing the goals of the law and the problems with implementing it).
41. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 872 (6th ed. 1990).
42. See Staples v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 1793, 1796-97 (1994) (noting that whether a
statute requires proof that the defendant knew the act was a violation under the statute is a
"question of statutory construction"); Ratzlaf v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 655, 659 (1994)
(stating that the interpretation of the meaning of the term willful is "influenced by its
context"); Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419, 424 (1985) (noting "[tihe definition of
the elements of a criminal offense is entrusted to the legislature, particularly in the case of
federal crimes, which are solely creatures of statute").
43. See United States v. Hayden, 64 F.3d 126, 128-30 (3d Cir. 1995). The court noted
that the word willful can be interpreted to require either purpose to commit a prohibited
act or intent to violate the law. Id. at 128. The Third Circuit held that for purposes of the
statute regulating the possession of firearms by a felon, it should be interpreted to require
proof of knowledge of the law). Id. at 130; see also United States v. Daughtry, 48 F.3d 829,
831 (4th Cir.) (distinguishing Ratzlaf and concluding that the term willful, for purposes of
False Statements Act, requires only intent to commit the act), cert. granted and judgment
vacated on other grounds, 116 S. Ct. 510 (1995).
44. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(b) (1962). Specifically, the Model Penal Code
states:
(b) Knowingly.
A person acts knowingly with respect to a material element of an offense when:
(i) if the element involves the nature of his conduct or the attendant circum-
stances, he is aware that his conduct is of that nature or that such circumstances
exist; and
(ii) if the element involves a result of his conduct, he is aware that it is practically
certain that his conduct will cause such a result.
Id.
45. United States v. Lawson, 780 F.2d 535, 542 (6th Cir. 1985) (finding that the trial
court was correct to instruct the jury that "[t]he word knowingly means that a defendant
realized what he was doing and was aware of the nature of his conduct. It means that he
did not act through ignorance, mistake or accident"); see also United States v. Udofot, 711
F.2d 831, 835-37 (8th Cir.) (holding that the term knowingly does not require proof of
specific intent), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 896 (1983); United States v. Arambasich, 597 F.2d
609, 612 (7th Cir. 1979) (upholding the trial court's instruction to the jury that "[t]he word
knowingly ... means that the act was done voluntarily and purposely, and not because of
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Penal Code, a person commits a crime willfully if he has the purpose of
committing the act.46 Generally, courts also have interpreted the term
willfully to require consciousness of the act itself but not necessarily the
unlawfulness of the act. 7 At trial, a jury typically is instructed that the
term willfully is defined as acting knowingly, deliberately, and intention-
ally and not accidentally, carelessly, or unintentionally.48
These general definitions support the well-founded maxim that igno-
rance of the law is no excuse.49 Consistent with that maxim, courts have
interpreted the term knowingly and willfully to mean only that one must
intend his act and that knowledge of the illegality of the act is not re-
quired.5" In the last twenty years, however, a line of Supreme Court
cases has defined the term knowingly and willfully as requiring knowl-
edge of the law.51 These cases focused on the language of the statute,52
mistake or accident"); see also 1 HON. EDWARD J. DEVITT ET AL., FEDERAL JURY PRAC-
TICE AND INSTRUCTIONS, CIVIL AND CRIMINAL § 17.04 (4th ed. 1992) (providing similar
boiler-plate language to be provided to a jury).
46. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(8) (1962) (stating that the requirement of
"wilfully [sic] is satisfied if a person acts knowingly with respect to the material elements of
the offense, unless a purpose to impose further requirements appears").
47. See, e.g., Ratzlaf v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 655, 664 (1994); Browder v. United
States, 312 U.S. 335, 341 (1941); Potter v. United States, 155 U.S. 438, 446 (1894).
48. E.g., United States v. Falk, 605 F.2d 1005, 1010 n.9 (7th Cir. 1979) (recognizing that
the term willful means "deliberately and intentionally as distinguished from something
which is merely careless, inadvertent or negligent"), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 903 (1980);
United States v. Berardelli, 565 F.2d 24, 30 (2d Cir. 1977) (holding that the instruction
given to the jury that the defendant must have a specific intent to commit the act was
correct, and the trial court properly refused to instruct the jury that the defendant should
know the law and intend to violate it); United States v. Dreitzler, 577 F.2d 539, 549 (9th
Cir. 1978) (concluding that the trial judge correctly instructed the jury that "fain act is done
willfully if done voluntarily and intentionally with knowledge that it is against the law"),
cert. denied, 440 U.S. 921 (1979); see also DEVITT, supra note 45, § 17.05 (furnishing similar
boiler-plate language to be provided to a jury).
49. See Cheek v. United States, 498 U.S. 192, 199 (1991) (reaffirming the deeply
rooted rule that ignorance or mistake of law is no excuse in a criminal prosecution); see
also ROLLIN M. PERKINS & RONALD N. BOYCE, CRIMINAL LAW 1029 (3d ed. 1982) (noting
that the legal maxim that ignorance of the law is no excuse has "come down through the
ages").
50. See, e.g. United States v. Cochran, 17 F.3d 56, 61 (3d. Cir.) (holding that, for pur-
poses of the federal child pornography statute, 18 U.S.C. § 2252, the term knowingly re-
quires a showing that the defendant knew the materials were of a pornographic nature but
does not require a showing that the defendant knew that the materials were illegal), cert.
denied, 115 S. Ct. 634 (1994); United States v. Lawson, 780 F.2d 535, 542 (6th Cir. 1985)
(holding that the word knowingly means understanding the nature of the conduct for pur-
poses of the sale or receipt of stolen goods in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2315); see also infra
text accompanying notes 61-67 (explaining the concept of mens rea).
51. See Staples v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 1793, 1804 (1994) (finding that a defendant
cannot be convicted for possession of an unregistered machine gun under the Oklahoma
statute unless the defendant knew of the gun's illegal features); Ratzlaf, 114 S. Ct. at 663
(holding that to convict a defendant of willfully violating a statute prohibiting financial
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legislative intent,53 protection of the inadvertent actor,54 and the rule of
lenity." Furthermore, requiring that the defendant know his conduct vi-
restructuring, the defendant must know the conduct was unlawful); Cheek, 498 U.S. at 202-
03 (stating that a defendant, who has a good-faith, although unreasonable, belief that his
conduct is not illegal cannot be convicted of tax evasion); Liparota v. United States, 471
U.S. 419, 433 (1985) (holding that the prosecution must prove the defendant knew that his
acquisition or possession of food stamps violated the statute or regulations); United States
v. Pomponio, 429 U.S. 10, 12 (1976) (per curiam) (defining willfully as "a voluntary, inten-
tional violation of a known legal duty").
52. E.g., Staples, 114 S. Ct. at 1796 (noting that whether a statute requires knowledge
that the act is illegal is a "question of statutory construction"); Connecticut Nat'l. Bank v.
Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253-54 (1992) (stating that the starting place for the Court's inquiry
into the meaning of a statute is its language); Ardestani v. INS, 502 U.S. 129, 135 (1991)
(noting that when interpreting statutes, the Court should start with "the language [of the
statute] itself ") (alteration in original).
53. E.g., Barnhill v. Johnson, 503 U.S. 393, 401 (1992) (stating that courts should turn
to the legislative history only when necessary to resolve statutory ambiguity); Liparota, 471
U.S. at 424 (stating that the definition of the elements of a crime is "entrusted to the
legislature"); United States v. Balint, 258 U.S. 250, 251-53 (1922) (noting that the requisite
mental state of a federal crime requires an "inference of the intent of Congress").
54. See Liparota, 471 U.S. at 426 (concluding that a requirement that one must know
the law to commit the offense is especially appropriate where any other interpretation of
the statute would result in the criminalization of "a broad range of apparently innocent
conduct"). This theory certainly is applicable to the anti-kickback provision. Courts have
struggled with what activities result in the offering or receipt of a "kickback," see United
States v. Hancock, 604 F.2d 999, 1001 (7th Cir.) (holding that fees from labs paid to refer-
ring physicians were kickbacks), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 991 (1979); what constitutes an "in-
ducement," see United States v. Greber, 760 F.2d 68, 71 (3d Cir.) (holding that payments
made to a referring physician that are based on the number of referrals are an inducement
even though the payments were in exchange for services rendered), cert. denied, 474 U.S.
988 (1985); whether the kickback must be the primary purpose of the transaction, see
United States v. Kats, 871 F.2d 105, 108 (9th Cir. 1989) (finding that it was permissible for a
jury to convict under the anti-kickback statute even if it found that the referral of services
was not a primary purpose for making payments); whether reasonable payments for serv-
ices still may be considered illegal kickbacks if in exchange for referrals, see United States
v. Bay State Ambulance and Hosp. Rental Serv., 874 F.2d 20, 30-31 (1st Cir. 1989) (holding
that to prove a violation of the anti-kickback statute it need not be shown that the pay-
ments were not reasonable for the service rendered); and whether an incentive program
established to encourage physicians to use a hospital can violate the anti-kickback statute,
see Polk County v. Peters, 800 F. Supp. 1451, 1456 (E.D. Tex. 1992) (concluding that incen-
tive programs violate the anti-kickback provision because the programs serve as an induce-
ment to refer patients to that hospital).
Additionally, the anti-kickback provision applies to self-referral arrangements not ad-
dressed by Stark I and Stark II. See supra notes 39-40 (discussing Stark I and Stark II); see
also Lisa M. Rockelli, Ninth Circuit Clarifies Rules In Hanlester Joint Venture Test Case, 4
HEALTH L. REP. (BNA) 553, 554 (1995) (discussing the importance of Hanlester because,
since the Stark laws do not reach many financial relationships, the anti-kickback provision
is still important). Physicians can comply with the Stark laws and still violate the anti-
kickback statute. Id. Because the law lacks clarity, a requirement that criminal liability
attaches only if one understands that he violated the law provides comfort to physicians
involved in such financial arrangements. Id.
55. The rule of lenity provides that ambiguity in a criminal statute should be resolved
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olated a law ensures that only defendants acting with a wrongful purpose
will be punished.56
Interestingly, only one case has defined the term knowingly and will-
fully as it relates to the anti-kickback provision of the Social Security
Act.57 In Hanlester Network v. Shalala58 the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Ninth Circuit defined the term knowingly and willfully as
requiring "specific intent to disobey the law," adopting a definition of the
word willfully applied by the Supreme Court.59 Citing the recent
Supreme Court cases supporting the proposition that the defendant must
know his act is illegal, the Ninth Circuit gave little reasoning for its deci-
sion to hold the prosecution to this increased burden.6 °
II. INTERPRETATION OF MENS REA REQUIREMENTS
A. Mens Rea Generally
Crimes can be categorized into three general classifications based on
in favor of the defendant. Rewis v. United States, 401 U.S. 808, 812 (1971); see, e.g., Rat-
z1af, 114 S. Ct. at 663 (stating that if the statute's "willfulness" requirement were ambigu-
ous, any doubt would be resolved in favor of the defendant); Moskal v. United States, 498
U.S. 103, 108 (1990) (stating that the rule of lenity should be employed only when there is
reasonable doubt about the statute's intent after looking to the legislative history);
Liparota, 471 U.S. at 427 (stating that the rule of lenity ensures fair warning of what consti-
tutes criminal conduct and "strikes the appropriate balance between the legislature, the
prosecutor, and the court in defining criminal liability"); United States v. Bass, 404 U.S.
336, 348-49 (1971) (noting that the rule of lenity should be applied only when doing so
would not conflict with congressional intent).
56. See Ratzlaf, 114 S. Ct. at 660-62; see also Staples, 114 S. Ct. at 1802 (holding that
the prosecution must prove that the defendant knew the law with respect to the possession
of firearms because to hold otherwise would criminalize apparently innocent conduct);
Cheek v. United States, 498 U.S. 192, 200 (1991) (noting that the Court has interpreted the
term willfully as requiring the prosecution to show that the defendant knew the law to
protect a person who misunderstood the law from being convicted); Liparota, 471 U.S. at
426-27 (concluding that, because the restrictions on the use of food stamps were so specific,
the prosecution must prove that the defendant knew the law to avoid punishing an inadver-
tent actor).
57. Hanlester Network v. Shalala, 51 F.3d 1390, 1394 (1995); see also Miller, supra
note 13, at 3 (noting that, before Hanlester was decided, no case law defined the term
knowingly and willfully in the context of the Medicare anti-kickback statute); see supra
note 17 (discussing United States v. Neufeld, 908 F. Supp. 491 (S.D. Ohio 1995), which
addressed the interpretation of the word willfully as used in the anti-kickback statute with-
out concluding upon a definition of the term).
58. 51 F.3d 1390 (9th Cir. 1995).
59. Id. at 1400.
60. See id. (accepting the definition of the word willfully prescribed by the Court in
United States v. Pomponio, 429 U.S. 10, 12 (1976) and Ratzlaf, 114 S. Ct. at 657); see infra
text accompanying notes 186-200 (analyzing the Hanlester holding regarding the definition
of knowingly and willfully).
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the requisite mens rea element.61 For strict liability crimes, criminal lia-
bility is imposed regardless of the defendant's state of mind.62 In contrast
to strict liability crimes, the other two classifications of crimes-specific
and general intent crimes-include the defendant's state of mind as an
element of proof.63 Specific intent crimes require that an act be done
with the specific purpose of effecting a criminal outcome,' but does not
require that he knew the result was illegal.65 On the other hand, general
intent crimes require proof that the defendant intentionally committed an
act, without requiring proof that he desired a particular result 66 or in-
tended to violate the law.6 7
61. The mens rea of a crime refers to the requisite mental state. SANFORD H. KADISH
& STEPHEN J. SCHULHOFER, CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS PROCESSES: CASES AND MATERIALS
217 (5th ed. 1989); see also BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 985 (6th ed. 1990) (defining mens
rea as "an element of criminal responsibility").
62. See United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394, 404 n.4 (1980) (noting that strict liability
crimes are "exceptions to the general rule that criminal liability requires an 'evil-meaning
mind' "); BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1422 (6th ed. 1990) (defining strict liability as liability
without fault); KADISH & SCHULHOFER, supra note 61, at 296 (noting that strict liability
statutes require no mens rea with respect to the elements of the offense).
63. See KADISH & SCHULHOFER, supra note 61, at 230; see also Bailey, 444 U.S. at 403
(explaining that this common law notion of general versus specific intent is ambiguous and
that there is a movement to replace this distinction with an analysis of the mens rea).
64. For example, larceny, which requires that the defendant intended to permanently
deprive the victim of his property, is a specific intent crime. See WAYNE R. LAFAVE &
AUSTIN W. ScoTt, JR., CRIMINAL LAW 224 (2d ed. 1986) (noting that larceny requires an
"intent to steal" the property). It is not required, however, that the defendant knew such
deprivation was illegal. See Ratzlaf v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 655, 665 n.4 (1994) (Black-
mun, J., dissenting) (noting that the term specific intent does not require knowledge of the
illegality; it merely requires the notion of purpose).
65. See 21 AM. JUR. 2D Criminal Law § 130 n.18 (1981) (noting that specific intent
exists when the offender desired the prohibited result, whereas general intent exists when
the prohibited result may reasonably be expected based on the circumstances, regardless of
whether the offender desired to accomplish that result); see also KADISH & SCHULHOFER,
supra note 61, at 230 (describing burglary as a specific intent crime because it requires
proof that the defendant had the purpose of committing a felony inside a building);
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 560 (6th ed. 1991) (defining specific intent as "the intent to
accomplish the precise act which the law prohibits").
Specific intent also may be defined as having an intent to engage in specific conduct, as
opposed to having a specific purpose. See LAFAVE & Scorr, supra note 64, at 224 (noting
that specific intent can be defined in several ways, but the "most common usage ... is to
designate a special mental element which is required above and beyond any mental state").
For purposes of this Comment, specific intent refers to the intent to accomplish a specific
purpose.
66. See KADISH & SCHULHOFER, supra note 61, at 230 (discussing trespass as a general
intent crime, requiring only that the defendant knew the nature of his act, "without proof
that he desired any particular further consequence"); see also BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
560 (6th ed. 1991) (defining general intent as "the intent to do that which the law prohibits.
It is not necessary for the prosecution to prove that the defendant intended the precise
harm or the precise result which eventuated").
67. See KADISH & SCHULHOFER, supra note 61, at 230 (noting that general intent
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Whether the anti-kickback provision is defined as a specific intent
crime or a general intent crime does not help determine the definition of
the term knowingly and willfully.68 If it is interpreted as a specific intent
crime, the defendant may have intended to receive or offer a kickback.69
The defendant need not have the specific purpose of violating the law to
have specific intent.7" If the anti-kickback provision is interpreted as a
crimes require only that the defendant intends to commit the act). It is not required that
the defendant intends to violate the law, nor that he is aware that the law makes the act
criminal. United States v. Blair, 54 F.3d 639, 642 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 220
(1995).
68. Because the anti-kickback provision prohibits the offering of remuneration to a
person "to induce such person," the statute could be classified as a specific intent crime.
See Miller, supra note 13, at 6-7 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(b)(2) (1988 & Supp. V
1993)) (noting that the decision in Inspector General v. Hanlester Network, et al., No. CV
92-4552-LHM, 1993 WL 78,299 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 10, 1993), supports the view that the anti-
kickback provision is a specific intent crime, because the use of the word "induce" suggests
an "intent to exercise influence over the reason or judgment of another in an effort to
cause the referral of [Medicare or Medicaid] business") (alteration in original); see also
Robert Fabrikant, Health Care Reform: The Use of Anti-Kickback Statutes in Private Liti-
gation, and The Need For an Antitrust-Type Approach, in HEALTH CARE REFORM INSTI-
TuTE 453, 472 (PLI Commercial Law & Practice Course Handbook Series No. A-700,
1994) (classifying the anti-kickback provision as a specific intent crime because it requires
proof of specific intent in order to find a criminal violation).
The distinction between specific and general intent has been made when defining terms
used to prescribe the requisite mental state. In United States v. Lizarraga-Lizarraga, 541
F.2d 826 (9th Cir. 1976), the Ninth Circuit held that the term willful in 22 U.S.C. § 1934,
regulating munitions control, required a showing of a "voluntary, intentional violation of a
known legal duty." Id. at 828. The court compared the requirement that the prosecution
prove that the defendant knew the law with the theory. of specific intent. Id. The court
noted that the term "willful" requires a showing of specific intent and analogized its con-
clusion to the conclusion drawn in tax law. Id. However, because courts and legal scholars
are inconsistent with their use of the term "specific intent," and because other courts have
not based its interpretation of the mens rea requirement upon this distinction, it would be
inaccurate to conclude that all specific intent crimes require a showing of knowledge of the
law. See United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394, 403 (1980) (noting that the ambiguity in the
definition of general and specific intent "has led to a movement away from the traditional
dichotomy of intent and toward an alternative analysis of mens rea").
69. Specific intent crimes only require that the defendant intend a specific result that
the law forbids. See Otto G. Obermaier, White-Collar Crime, in MENS REA: STATE OF
MIND DEFENSES IN CRIMINAL AND CIVIL FRAUD CASES 121 (PLI Litig. & Admin. Practice
Course Handbook Series No. 140, 1985) (stating that specific intent crimes require proof
that the defendant committed an act with an intent to do something that is illegal). There-
fore, a violation of the anti-kickback provision merely would require an intent to receive a
kickback.
70. See Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 270 (1952) (stating that knowing
conversion, a specific intent crime, requires "knowledge of the facts, though not necessar-
ily the law, that made the taking a conversion"); cf. United States v. Kozminski, 487 U.S.
931, 975 (1988) (stating that, for the crime of involuntary servitude, "[tlo establish specific
intent the government must prove that the defendant knowingly did an act which the law
forbids, or knowingly failed to do an act which the law requires, purposely intending to
violate the law"). This inconsistency shows that it is not the designation as a specific intent
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general intent crime, it is sufficient that the defendant intended to enter
into a financial relationship in which remunerations were received in ex-
change for referrals, and, again, intent to violate the law is not required.71
Generally, ignorance or mistake of law is a defense to the commission
of an otherwise punishable crime if it negates the requisite mental state.7"
While ignorance of the law suggests lack of awareness of the law, mistake
connotes misunderstanding of the law.7 3 Therefore, the definition of the
term knowingly and willfully has an important impact on the defense of
mistake. If one must know and intend to violate the law, the defendant
may assert the defense that he misunderstood the law.74 If one merely
must understand and intend the act, misunderstanding the law will not
negate that mental state.75 Thus, if the anti-kickback statute is defined as
requiring a showing of knowledge of the law, a defendant could use the
mistake of law defense.
B. The Court's Interpretation of Mens Rea
Courts may interpret statutes that contain no explicit mens rea require-
ment to have one implicitly.76 The Supreme Court typically has imposed
a mens rea requirement when Congress has not provided one explicitly in
crime that requires the prosecution to show knowledge of the law, but the language of the
specific statute itself. See Ratzlaf v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 655, 659 (1994) (noting that a
statute must be interpreted based on its context).
71. See supra note 67 and accompanying text (noting that general intent does not re-
quire that one intend to violate the law).
72. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.04(1)(a) (1962); see WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AUSTIN W.
ScoTT, JR., 1 SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW § 5.1, at 575-76 (1986) (noting the simplicity of
the proposition that ignorance or mistake of fact is a valid defense in that it negates mens
rea, a required element of a crime).
73. See LAFAVE & ScoTT, supra note 72, § 5.1, at 575-77, 585. Mistake of fact may
also be justification for committing a crime, Id. at 575. Mistake of fact, however, will not
be discussed in this Comment, as the definition of the term knowingly and willfully does
not affect that defense.
74. See Ratzlaf, 114 S. Ct. at 665-66 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (arguing that the major-
ity's holding that willfulness requires knowledge of the law negates the general rule that
ignorance and mistake of law is no excuse); United States v. Zehrbach, 47 F.3d 1252, 1261
(3d Cir.) (noting that mistake of law is a complete defense when knowledge of the law is
required), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1699 (1995).
75. See United States v. Freed, 401 U.S. 601, 612 (1971) (Brennan, J., concurring)
(stating that "[i]f the ancient maxim that 'ignorance of the law is no excuse' has any
residual validity, it indicates that the ordinary intent requirement-mens rea-of the crimi-
nal law does not require knowledge that an act is illegal, wrong, or blameworthy").
76. See Posters 'n' Things, LTD. v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 1747, 1750 (1994). In
Posters, the defendant was convicted of violating the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, which
stated:
It is unlawful for any person-
(1) to make use of the services of the Postal Service or other interstate convey-
ance as part of a scheme to sell drug paraphernalia;
Medicare Anti-kickback Provision
the statute, unless Congress affirmatively has manifested an intent to dis-
pense with it. 7 In these cases, the Court generally requires at least a
showing that the defendant had knowledge of facts that would make him
conscious that the conduct probably was regulated.78 If the courts were
to dispense with a mens rea requirement entirely, apparently innocent
conduct would be criminalized, because the mere occurrence of the act
would make it punishable regardless of the defendant's state of mind.7 9
(2) to offer for sale and transportation in interstate or foreign commerce drug
paraphernalia; or
(3) to import or export drug paraphernalia.
Id. at 1749-50 (quoting 21 U.S.C. § 857(a) (1988) (repealed 1990)). That provision did not
contain a specific scienter, or state of mind, requirement. Id. at 1750. The Court con-
cluded that lack of an express scienter requirement, however, did not justify the "conclu-
sion that Congress intended to dispense entirely with a scienter requirement." Id. at 1752.
The Court held that the statute requires that the defendant know that the customer likely
will use the drug paraphernalia with drugs. Id. at 1753; see also United States v. Bailey,
444 U.S. 394, 408 (1980) (holding that the prosecution must show knowledge of the law to
convict the defendant of escaping from federal custody). In Bailey, the defendant was
convicted of violating 18 U.S.C. § 751(a), which provides that "'[w]hoever escapes or at-
tempts to escape from the custody of the Attorney General or his authorized representa-
tive, or from any institution or facility in which he is confined ... shall, if the custody or
confinement is by virtue of an arrest ... be fined not more than $5,000 or imprisoned.' "
Bailey, 444 U.S. at 397 n.1 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 751(a)). The Court noted that the omis-
sion of an explicit mens rea requirement in a statute does not impose strict liability for the
crime. Id. at 406 n.6. The Court turned to the Model Penal Code and the proposed revi-
sion of the Federal Criminal Code for a definition of "escape." Id. at 408. Noting that the
legislative history of § 751 did not contradict these sources, the Court held that the prose-
cution must show that the defendant knew that he was leaving the jail without permission.
Id.
77. See Staples v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 1793, 1797 (1994)' (stating that "silence
[concerning the mens rea requirement] by itself does not necessarily suggest that Congress
intended to dispense with a conventional mens rea element, which would require that the
defendant know the facts that make his conduct illegal"). Generally, the Court disfavors
construction of offenses without a mens rea requirement. See Posters 'n' Things, Ltd., 114
S. Ct. at 1752-53 (finding that merely because Congress did not explicitly state a mens rea
requirement does not mean that Congress intended to dispense with a mens rea require-
ment entirely); Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419, 425 (1985) (noting that the statute
has a mens rea requirement absent indication to the contrary by Congress); United States
v. Balint, 258 U.S. 250, 251-52 (1922) (stating that, generally, every crime has an element of
scienter).
78. These statutes are said to fall under the public welfare offense doctrine. Posters 'n'
Things, 114 S. Ct. at 1753. The public welfare offense doctrine is said to impose "strict
liability," but it actually does require a showing of at least some knowledge that the con-
duct probably was regulated. Id.; see also Staples, 114 S. Ct. at 1798 n.3 (noting that to say
the public welfare offense doctrine imposes "strict liability" is a misnomer because there is
some requirement of knowledge, although knowledge that the conduct is an offense need
not be shown); infra text accompanying notes 238-42 (discussing the public welfare offense
doctrine as it relates to the anti-kickback provision).
79. Liparota, 471 U.S. at 425. There is a general notion that conduct should be pun-
ished when the defendant makes an inappropriate choice between good and evil. Id. The
Court in Liparota used the example of a person who possesses food stamps because he
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If a statute explicitly prescribes a mens rea requirement, but the mental
state required is ambiguous, the Court employs a hierarchical analysis.8"
First, the Court looks to the language of the statute.8" If that language is
ambiguous, the Court turns to legislative intent.8 2 If Congress' intent is
unclear, the Court applies the rule of lenity, which requires an interpreta-
tion of the statute in favor of the defendant.
8 3
inadvertently received them in the mail. Id. at 426-27. If there were no mens rea require-
ment, that act would be punishable under 7 U.S.C. § 2024(b)(1), which makes it criminal to
possess food stamps in an unauthorized manner. Id. at 426. As a result, seemingly inno-
cent conduct becomes criminalized. Id. at 426-27.
80. See generally Ratzlaf v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 655, 659-63 (1994) (analyzing the
statute to determine the meaning of the term willfully). See also supra note 12 and accom-
panying text (discussing the Court's struggle with interpreting terms used in statutes to
determine the requisite mens rea).
81. Staples, 114 S. Ct. at 1797 (stating that the language of the statute is the starting
place of the analysis); Connecticut Nat'l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253-54 (1992)
(noting that the court must presume that the legislature intended the meaning of the words
of the statute itself); Rubin v. United States, 449 U.S. 424, 430 (1981) (stating that when the
language of the statute is clear, the court may look no further absent " 'rare and excep-
tional circumstance' ") (quoting TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 187 n. 3 (1978) (quoting Crooks
v. Harrelson, 282 U.S. 55, 60 (1930))).
82. Barnhill v. Johnson, 503 U.S. 393, 401 (1992) (stating that legislative history should
be referred to only to resolve ambiguity in the statute); Liparota, 471 U.S. at 424-25 (con-
sidering the language of the statute and then the legislative history to determine the in-
tended meaning of the word "knowingly"); see also supra note 53 (discussing the
examination of congressional intent to determine the requisite mens rea).
It should be noted that there is debate regarding whether legislative history should be
referred to at all. Hon. Stephen Breyer, On the Uses of Legislative History in Interpreting
Statutes, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 845, 845 (1992). Some argue that legislative history does not
represent Congress' intent. Compare, e.g., Wisconsin Public Intervenor v. Mortier, 501
U.S. 597, 617 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring) (recognizing that legislative history is an unreli-
able gauge of congressional intent); United States v. R.L.C., 503 U.S. 291, 311 (1992)
(Thomas, J., concurring) (noting that the use of legislative history to interpret an ambigu-
ous penal statute against a criminal defendant is in conflict with the rule of lenity); Note,
Why Learned Hand Would Never Consult Legislative History Today, 105 HARV. L. REV.
1005, 1005 (1992) (explaining that legislative history should not be used because it does not
truly reflect Congress' intent and because it detracts from the judiciary's role in interpret-
ing statutes) with Breyer, supra at 847-48 (arguing in favor of the use of legislative history
to help the "court understand the context and purpose of a statute"); William N. Eskridge,
Jr., Dynamic Statutory Interpretation, 135 U. PA. L: REV. 1479, 1479 (1987) (advocating the
use of legislative history, noting that statutes should be interpreted "in light of their pres-
ent societal, political, and legal context"); Wendy M. Rogovin, The Politics of Facts: "The
Illusion of Certainty," 46 HASTINGS L.J. 1723, 1754 (1995) (arguing that legislative history
is an effective tool when the court is looking for a factual basis for particular legislation).
83. E.g., Staples, 114 S. Ct. at 1804 n.17 (stating that the rule of lenity is reserved for
cases where, after looking to all other sources of interpretation, "the Court 'is left with an
ambiguous statute' ") (quoting Smith v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 2050, 2059 (1993) (quot-
ing United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 347 (1971))); Chapman v. United States, 500 U.S.
453, 463 (1991) (noting that the rule of lenity is applicable only where there is "grievous
ambiguity or uncertainty" in the statute); Liparota, 471 U.S. at 427 (stating that
"[aIpplication of the rule of lenity ensures that criminal statutes will provide fair warning
1996] Medicare Anti-kickback Provision
1. The Tax Law Exception
In analyzing the language of the statute to determine Congress' intent,
the Court may look to the severity of the offense to determine the mens
rea requirement. For example, in Spies v. United States,84 the Court dis-
tinguished between willful failure to pay tax when due, a misdemeanor,
and willful attempt to defeat and evade tax, a felony.85 Noting that both
crimes must be committed willfully, the Court considered whether the
difference in punishment justified different interpretations of the meaning
of the term willful for each statute. 86 The Court concluded, however, that
the word willful does not mean different things in each offense.87 In both
provisions, the term willful includes an "element of evil motive. 88 The
difference between a failure to pay tax when due and tax evasion is not
the level of punishment, but rather, the requirement that the felony be
committed with an attempt to evade taxes.89 The Court found that Con-
gress, through its use of the word attempt, intended the crime of tax eva-
sion to require "some willful commission in addition to the willful
concerning conduct rendered illegal and strikes the appropriate balance between the legis-
lature, the prosecutor, and the court in defining criminal liability"); Rewis v. United States,
401 U.S. 808, 812 (1971) (holding that ambiguity in "criminal statutes should be resolved in
favor of lenity"); see also supra note 55 (discussing the rule of lenity).
84. 317 U.S. 492 (1943).
85. Id. at 497.
86. Id.
87. See id. at 498.
88. Id. at 498-99. The Court noted that an affirmative willful attempt may include
keeping a double set of books, making false entries, creating false documents, or other
fraudulent devices. Id. at 499.
89. Id. at 498. This conclusion is consistent With the proposition that a word has the
same meaning when used in several places within a statute. See Ratzlaf v. United States,
114 S. Ct. 655, 660 (1994) (noting that a term used within a statute several times is gener-
ally interpreted the same way each time it appears).
This idea also may rebut any argument that changing the penalty for a violation of the
anti-kickback provision from a misdemeanor to a felony in 1977 affected the meaning of
knowingly and willfully. See supra note 32 (discussing the history of the anti-kickback
provision and the 1977 amendment). Interpreting knowingly and willfully as requiring
knowledge of the law, as the court did in Hanlester Network v. Shalala, 51 F.3d 1390, 1400
(9th Cir. 1994), protects the inadvertent actor. See Ratzlaf, 114 S. Ct. at 663 (requiring
proof that the defendant knew and intended to violate the anti-structuring statute because
otherwise, the statute could be violated without an evil motive). This interpretation, how-
ever, is not intended to protect the defendant only from a felony. Rather, if the defendant
did not know and intend to violate the law, he is protected from liability altogether. As
stated in Spies, a willful violation requires some evil motive. Spies, 317 U.S. at 498; see also
United States v. Bishop, 412 U.S. 346, 361 (1973) (holding that willfully has the same
meaning in the misdemeanor and felony sections of the tax code). If the prohibited con-
duct is willful, whether punishable as a misdemeanor or a felony, it still is punishable. Id.
Therefore, that a violation of the anti-kickback provision is punishable as a felony does not
help in defining the term knowingly and willfully.
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omissions that" are required for the crime of failure to pay tax when
due.90 The Court concluded that willful failure to pay tax is not as egre-
gious as willful tax evasion, because tax evasion involves both intent to
avoid taxes and an active attempt to do so, whereas failure to pay tax
merely entails an intentional but passive neglect to pay what is rightfully
due.91 Spies is an example where the Court looked to the language of the
statute to determine the congressional intent and deferred to Congress
the responsibility of defining the words in a way not apparent on the stat-
ute's face.92
Similarly, Cheek v. United States93 also involved tax evasion and failure
to file tax returns.94 The Cheek Court acknowledged that it is well settled
that the term willful, as used in tax statutes, requires proof that the de-
fendant knew of the legal duty and "voluntarily and intentionally violated
that duty."95 The Court held that a good-faith belief, albeit unreasona-
ble, that the defendant was complying with the law is sufficient to negate
the willfulness requirement.
96
Tax law is an example of an area where the law is ambiguous and diffi-
cult to understand. 97 To protect defendants from being convicted of a
crime they inadvertently committed, the Court has "carv[ed] out an ex-
ception to the traditional rule" that ignorance of the law is no excuse. 98
Therefore, in tax law, the term willfully is understood to mean "an act
done with a bad purpose" 99 or with "an evil motive."'10 Arguably, analy-
sis of the anti-kickback provision is analogous to tax law in that it also is
difficult to understand.'O' Therefore, an exception to the general rule
that ignorance of the law is no excuse would be justified.'0 2
90. Spies, 317 U.S. at 499.
91. Id.
92. Id.; see supra note 52 (discussing the analysis of the language of the statute itself to
determine the requisite mens rea).
93. 498 U.S. 192 (1991).
94. Id. at 201.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 203.
97. Id. at 200.
98. Id.
99. United States v. Murdock, 290 U.S. 389, 394 (1933).
100. United States v. Bishop, 412 U.S. 346, 361 (1973).
101. See supra note 54 (discussing the courts' struggle with the interpretation of the
anti-kickback provision). The courts have recognized an exception to the general rule that
ignorance of the law is no excuse in ambiguous statutes other than tax law. See infra notes
103-26 and accompanying text (discussing' other areas of the law where the court found
ignorance of the law to be an excuse).
102. See infra note 171 (discussing the applicability of imposing a higher burden on the
prosecution when the statute is ambiguous).
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2. The Recent Expanded Application of the Ignorance Defense
In addition to the area of tax law, the Supreme Court has applied an
exception to the general rule that ignorance of the law is no excuse to
other areas of the law.10 3 In Liparota v. United States,1°4 the Supreme
Court held that knowingly, as applied in a statute governing food stamp
fraud, °5 meant that the defendant knew he acted in a manner unauthor-
ized by statute. 106 To arrive at this conclusion, the Court first looked to
the language of the statute and then to the legislative history. 10 7 Finding
little guidance, the Court turned to the rule of lenity.' 8 Requiring the
court to favor the defendant, the rule necessitated that knowingly be in-
terpreted to mean that the defendant must know he violated the law. 10 9
Most recently, in Ratzlaf v. United States, 10 the Supreme Court held
that to be criminally liable for structuring financial transactions, the de-
fendant must have specific knowledge that his conduct was unlawful."'
103. E.g., Staples v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 1793, 1802 (1994) (requiring knowledge of
the law to convict a defendant of possession of an unregistered gun); Ratzlaf v. United
States, 114 S. Ct. 655, 663 (1994) (holding that willfully, as used in the currency structuring
statute, requires that the defendant have knowledge that he violated the law); Liparota v.
United States, 471 U.S. 419, 426-27 (1985) (requiring the prosecution to prove the defend-
ant knew he violated the law related to fraudulent use of food stamps); United States v.
Baker, 63 F.3d 1478, 1491 (9th Cir. 1995) (noting that an exception to the general rule that
ignorance of the law is no excuse has been recognized for complex regulatory schemes),
cert. denied, 64 U.S.L.W. 3502 (1996); United States v. Fierros, 692 F.2d 1291, 1295 (9th
Cir.) (stating that ignorance of the law may be an excuse in crimes involving complex
statutes), cert. denied, 462 U.S. 1120 (1983); United States v. Lizarraga-Lizarraga, 541 F.2d
826, 828-29 (9th Cir. 1976) (noting the complexity of the statute regulating the exportation
of ammunition, and holding that the defendant must have known the law and intended to
violate it to be convicted).
104. 471 U.S. 419 (1985).
105. The statute provides that "whoever knowingly uses, transfers, acquires, alters, or
possesses coupons, [or] authorization cards" in any manner not authorized by the statute
or the regulations shall be guilty of a crime. 7 U.S.C. § 2024(b)(1) (1994).
106. Liparota, 471 U.S. at 425.
107. Id. at 424-25. The defendant in Liparota was a co-owner of a sandwich shop. Id.
at 421. He acquired food stamps without the authorization of the Department of Agricul-
ture. Id. The defendant purchased these food stamps from an undercover agent at less
than face value. Id. The issue facing the Supreme Court was whether "the Government
must prove that the defendant knew that he was acting in a manner not authorized by
statute or regulations." Id. The Court noted that, while the statute requires one to act
knowingly, "Congress [did] not explicitly spell [I out the mental state required." Id. at
424. The Court determined that Congress intended some mental state by using the word
knowingly, but "[b]eyond this, the words themselves provide little guidance." Id.
108. Id. at 427.
109. Id. The Court held that requiring the prosecution to prove mens rea upholds the
longstanding principal that "ambiguity concerning the ambit of criminal statutes should be
resolved in favor of lenity." Id. (quoting Rewis v. United States, 401 U.S. 808, 812 (1971)).
110. 114 S. Ct. 655 (1994).
111. Id. at 663.
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The defendant in Ratzlaf was charged with violating the anti-structuring
provision of 31 U.S.C. § 5324, which makes it illegal to structure transac-
tions with the purpose of avoiding the requirement that the bank report
deposits over $10,000 to the Treasury, by making numerous deposits
under $10,000.112 Analyzing the statutory language, the Court concluded
that knowledge of the law was a required element of proof.1 13 The Court
noted that § 5324 required that the defendant act with the purpose of
evading the reporting requirements of § 5313(a).114 This reasoning sug-
gests that "evil motive" must be present, similar to the requirement under
tax law.'
15
Currency structuring can exist without an evil motive, and those situa-
tions should not be illegal. 116 For example, one might have motives for
making small deposits other than avoiding the reporting requirement,
such as fear of burglary or desire to hide one's wealth from other individ-
uals." 7 Requiring knowledge of the law protects those who do not act
with a wrongful purpose. 118 Additionally, § 5322 imposes criminal penal-
ties on ones who willfully violate § 5324.119 Because § 5324 prohibits pur-
posely evading reporting requirements' and § 5322 requires a willful
violation of § 5324 for criminal penalties to be imposed, it follows that
112. 31 U.S.C. § 5324(a) (Supp. V 1993). The statute states that "[n]o person shall for
the purpose of evading the reporting requirements of section 5313(a) ... with respect to
such transaction ... (3) structure or assist in structuring, or attempt to structure or assist in
structuring, any transaction with one or more domestic financial institutions." Id.; see infra
note 119 (stating the criminal provision under 31 U.S.C. § 5322(a)).
113. Ratzlaf, 114 S. Ct. at 659-63.
114. Id. at 660.
115. See Cheek v. United States, 498 U.S. 192, 200 (1991) (noting that "willful" as used
in criminal tax statutes requires the act to be done with a "bad purpose").
116. Ratzlaf, 114 S. Ct. at 660-61 (noting that not all schemes to avoid a regulation are
illegal).
117. Id. at 661. The Court noted that there are situations where a person might attempt
to avoid the reporting requirement by reducing the size of the deposits made to the bank,
but the reasons for doing so lack the "evil motive." Id. Because the statute technically can
be violated without a bad purpose, the statute should require proof of such bad purpose to
convict the defendant. Id. Otherwise, a defendant who inadvertently violates that statute
could be punished criminally. Id.
118. Id. at 660.
119. Id. at 662. Section 5322(a) reads: "A person willfully violating [31 U.S.C. §§ 5311-
5326] or a regulation prescribed under this subchapter ... shall be fined not more than
$250,000, or imprisoned for not more than five years, or both." 31 U.S.C. § 5322(a) (Supp.
V 1993).
120. "Purposely" is defined by the Model Penal Code as follows:
(i) if the element involves the nature of his conduct or a result thereof, it is his
conscious object to engage in conduct of that nature or to cause such a result; and
(ii) if the element involves the attendant circumstances, he is aware of the exist-
ence of such circumstances or he believes or hopes that they exist.
MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(a) (1962).
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knowledge of the act alone is insufficient for structuring to be a crime.121
The statutes suggest that Congress intended that the defendant must
know that transactions in excess of $10,000 must be reported and he also
must know of "his duty not to avoid triggering such a report.
122
The Court in Ratzlaf noted that its analysis could stop here because the
language of the statute indicated clearly that the meaning of willfully re-
quires knowledge of the law. 23 The Court also noted, however, that the
legislative history is ambiguous, which, if the issue could not have been
decided based on the language of the statute, would require the Court to
apply the rule of lenity and decide the issue in favor of the defendant.
124
Therefore, even had the statutory language not resolved the issue, the
Court ultimately would have reached the same conclusion. 125 Finally, the
Court concluded that its opinion was not in conflict with the maxim that
ignorance of the law is no excuse because Congress may expressly deviate
from that principle, as it had done in this case.
126
121. See Ratzlaf, 114 S. Ct. at 660-61. Subsequent to Ratzlaf, § 5324(c) was added,
which imposes a criminal penalty for a violation of § 5324. Riegle Community Develop-
ment & Regulatory Improvement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-325, § 411, 108 Stat. 2160,
2253 (to be codified at 31 U.S.C. § 5324(c)). Therefore, § 5322, which requires that the
violation be willful, no longer must be resorted to for the purpose of determining punish-
ment for a violation of § 5324, and willfulness no longer is required for criminal liability
related to a violation of § 5324. United States v. Zehrbach, 47 F.3d 1252, 1262 n.7 (3d Cir.
1995), cert. denied sub nom. Mervis v. United States, 115 S. Ct. 1699 (1995).
122. Ratzlaf, 114 S. Ct. at 662.
123. See id.
124. Id. at 662-63.
125. See id.
126. Id. at 663. The dissent disagreed with the majority's application of tax law to this
statute. Id. at 663-70 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). It noted that the rule is that ignorance of
the law is no excuse, id. at 664, and the exception to that rule is applicable only to tax law.
Id. at 667. The dissent noted that " 'willfully' ... generally 'refers to consciousness of the
act but not to consciousness that the act is unlawful.' " Id. at 664 (quoting Cheek v. United
States, 498 U.S. 192, 209 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment)). According to the
dissent, the majority was incorrect in holding that the word willful would be superfluous if
defined to require only knowledge of the act. Id. at 665. Instead, the dissent reasoned that
the requirement of willful in the currency structuring statute should require that the de-
fendant have knowledge of the reporting requirement, not the law that makes avoiding the
requirement criminal. Id. at 665-66. The distinction between the general definition of
willfulness, requiring knowledge of the act, and the exception, requiring knowledge of the
law, should be based on "whether the statute criminalizes 'a broad range of apparently
innocent conduct.' " Id. at 666 n.6 (quoting Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419, 426
(1985)). The dissent argued that innocent conduct would not be illegal under the structur-
ing statute, even if the word willful is interpreted as requiring knowledge of only the act,
because the defendant would not have the requisite purpose of evading the reporting re-
quirement. Id. Therefore, the exceptional definition of willfulness should not apply to this
statute. Id.
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3. Application of the Court's Statutory Analysis
Many courts have followed the approach of the above cases-specifi-
cally Ratzlaf-and held that the terms knowingly and willfully require
knowledge that the act is illegal. 27 In United States v. Wynn, 28 the de-
fendant was charged with currency structuring in violation of 31 U.S.C.
§ 5324(a)(3). 12 9 Applying Ratzlaf, the United States Court of Appeals
for the D.C. Circuit held that the statute required the prosecution to
show that Wynn knew his act was illegal.'3 ° The court noted that the acts
Wynn committed in 1987 and 1988 were not illegal until 1987.131 Using
this as support for the fact that Wynn was unaware that his action was
illegal, the court reversed the structuring convictions.'
32
In United States v. Hayden, 33 the United States Court of Appeals for
the Third Circuit applied the Ratzlaf analysis to arrive at the conclusion
that the word willfully, as used in the provision providing criminal penal-
ties for the statute regulating the ownership of firearms, required knowl-
edge of the law.' 3 ' The court acknowledged that the term willful can be
interpreted to mean either knowledge of the act or knowledge of the
law. 135 The court then looked to the legislative history to interpret Con-
127. See United States v. Hayden, 64 F.3d 126, 130-31 (3d Cir. 1995) (holding that the
term willfully should be interpreted to require knowledge of the law for purposes of the
statute regarding receiving firearms while under a felony information); United States v.
Wynn, 61 F.3d. 921, 927 (D.C. Cir.) (applying the definition of the word willful used in
Ratzlaf to a violation of currency structuring), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 578 (1995).
128. 61 F.3d 921 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 578 (1995).
129. Id. at 923; see supra notes 112, 119 (providing the text of 31 U.S.C. § 5324 and
§ 5322).
130. Wynn, 61 F.3d at 927. Ratzlaf was issued while Wynn's case was pending appeal.
Id. Therefore, the Ratzlaf decision controlled the court in Wynn. Id. The court held that
there was insufficient evidence to show that Wynn knew his act was illegal. Id. Therefore,
his conviction was reversed. Id.
131. Id. at 928. The court concluded that, since Wynn's act was completely legal until
1987, the fact that he violated the anti-structuring law is insufficient to prove he had knowl-
edge of the law. Id.
132. Id. at 929. The court, however, upheld the convictions for money laundering,
transacting in criminally derived property, and conspiracy. Id.
133. 64 F.3d 126 (3d Cir. 1995).
134. Id. at 128-32. In Hayden, the defendant "was convicted of receiving a firearm
while under a felony 'information,"' in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(n). Id. at 127. 18
U.S.C. § 924(a)(1)(D) provides the criminal penalty for violating § 922(n), making it a fel-
ony to willfully violate that section. Id. at 128 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 924(a)(1)(D) (1994)).
135. Id. at 128. This is significant because the court in Hanlester adopted the definition
applied in Ratzlaf as if the Ratzlaf Court imposed a black letter definition of willfully. See
Hanlester Network v. Shalala, 51 F.3d at 1390, 1400 (9th Cir. 1995) (citing Ratzlaf in con-
cluding that the term knowingly and willfully requires knowledge of the law and intent to
disobey that law). As the Hayden court pointed out, the Ratzlaf Court concluded that the
interpretation of the word willfully requires knowledge of the law because of the specific
wording of that statute. Hayden, 64 F.3d at 131; see also United States v. Zehrbach, 47
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gress' intent. 3 6 Significantly, the court noted that Congress used the
word knowingly in some provisions and the word willfully in another pro-
vision.137 The court concluded that the use of the word willfully indicates
a scienter requirement different from that required when the word know-
ingly is used. 138 The word knowingly generally is defined as requiring the
defendant to understand the act. 1 39 Therefore, because the word know-
ingly and the word willfully are found in different provisions of the same
statute, the term willfully means the prosecution must show that the de-
fendant knew the conduct was illegal.' 4°
Other courts, such as the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit in United States v. Daughtry,"' have distinguished Ratzlaf
and held that the term knowingly and willfully does not require knowl-
edge that the act is illegal.'42 The Daughtry court held that, in the con-
text of the false statements statute, 43 the word willfully does not require
the defendant to have knowledge that the law is being violated.'" The
court noted that in this statute, 45 the word willfully relates to the false
F.3d 1252, 1262 (3d Cir.) (holding that the prosecution need not prove that the defendant
knew the act was illegal in a case of bankruptcy fraud, noting that the Ratzlaf Court em-
phasized that its interpretation of the term willfully as requiring knowledge of the law was
limited to the meaning of the particular statute before the Court), cert. denied sub nom.
Mervis v. United States, 115 S. Ct. 1699 (1995).
136. Hayden, 64 F.3d at 129-30.
137. Id. at 130.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id. This holding is consistent with the holding in Hanlester. See Hanlester Net-
work v. Shalala, 51 F.3d 1390, 1400 (9th Cir. 1995) (ruling that the phrase knowingly and
willfully requires that the defendant knew and intended to disobey the law). Because the
anti-kickback provision requires the defendant to act knowingly and willfully, under the
court's analysis in Hayden, willfully must mean that the defendant knows the law. See
Hayden, 64 F.3d at 130: United States v. Obiechie, 38 F.3d 309, 315 (7th Cir. 1994) (con-
cluding that the term willfully is distinct from the term knowingly because willfully requires
knowledge of the law); cf United States v. Fierros, 692 F.2d 1291, 1293 (9th Cir. 1982)
(concluding that knowingly and willfully in a statute relating to harboring aliens does not
require knowledge of the law; knowledge goes to the status of the alien and willfully goes
to concealing aliens from detection), cert. denied, 462 U.S. 1120 (1983).
141. 48 F.3d 829 (4th Cir.), cert. granted and judgment vacated on other grounds, 116 S.
Ct. 510 (1995).
142. See id. at 831 (noting that the language of the false statements statute can be dis-
tinguished from the language of the currency statute addressed in Ratzlaf because a de-
fendant cannot make a false statement, as defined in the act, without an evil intent); see
also United States v. Hopkins, 53 F.3d 533, 537-39 (2d Cir. 1995) (noting that the Clean
Water Act requires that the defendant act knowingly, which is distinguishable from a re-
quirement that he act willfully), cert. denied, 64 U.S.L.W. 3484 (1996).
143. 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (1994).
144. Daughtry, 48 F.3d at 831.
145. 18 U.S.C. § 1001 provides that:
[w]hoever ... knowingly and willfully falsifies, conceals or covers up by any trick,
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statement and not to the law that makes false statements illegal.146 The
court reasoned that the language of the false statement statute, in con-
trast to the language of the currency structuring statute examined in Rat-
zlaf, does not indicate that the statute can be violated only by knowing
the law and intending to disregard it.'4 7 This distinction can be explained
by using the "evil motive" analysis. 148 Unlike currency structuring, one
cannot willfully make a false statement without an evil intent. 149 There-
fore, there is no need for a mechanism to protect the inadvertent actor.1
5 0
In United States v. Hopkins, 5' the defendant was charged with violat-
ing the Clean Water Act, 5 ' under which criminal liability is imposed
scheme, or device a material fact, or makes any false, fictitious or fraudulent
statements or representations, or makes or uses any false writing or document
knowing the same to contain any false, fictitious or fraudulent statement or entry,
shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.
18 U.S.C. § 1001 (1994).
146. Daughtry, 48 F.3d at 831.
147. Id. The Daughtry court distinguished the false statement statute from the currency
structuring statute by focusing on the word "purpose" found in the currency structuring
statute. Id. It noted that in Ratzlaf the Court found that the combination of the word
"purpose" and the word "willful" indicated that the meaning of "willful" required knowl-
edge of the law. Id. In contrast, the false statement statute does not require that the
defendant act purposely. Id. Therefore, the decision in Ratzlaf cannot be applied to this
statute. Id.; see also supra note 135 (discussing the limitations of the Ratzlaf holding).
148. See Daughtry, 48 F.3d at 831 (citing United States v. Curran, 20 F.3d 560, 567-68
(3d Cir. 1994)) (distinguishing the requirements of the false statement statute and the re-
quirements of the statute defining a principal in a crime, which requires an "evil intent").
In Ratzlaf, the Court noted that the act of currency restructuring could be committed with-
out a bad purpose, such as for purposes of avoiding burglary or hiding your wealth from
your wife. Ratzlaf v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 655, 661 (1994). In Daughtry, by contrast,
the court notes that a person cannot willfully make a false statement without a bad pur-
pose. Daughtry, 48 F.3d at 831. Therefore, proof of bad purpose is not necessary to con-
vict a defendant of a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1001. Id.
149. Daughtry, 48 F.3d at 831.
150. See id. (noting that § 1001 requires only that one act with knowledge that the state-
ments were not true). Because a defendant must make a statement he knows to be false,
there can be no inadvertent actor. Id. at 832. This outcome can be distinguished from
statutes requiring knowledge of the law. For example, in Ratzlaf, the Court noted that a
violation of the currency restructuring is not necessarily made with an evil intent. See
Ratzlaf, 114 S. Ct. at 661 (listing two instances where the statute can be technically violated
without evil intent on the part of the defendant, such as attempting to avoid the risk of
being burglarized by making smaller deposits). Similarly, the anti-kickback provision may
be technically violated without evil intent. See Hanlester Network v. Shalala, 51 F.3d 1390,
1401 (9th Cir. 1995) (noting that the management service agreement entered into by
Hanlester and SKBL reflected common practices in the field, and there was no evidence
that the appellants intended to violate the law; rather, the appellants believed their con-
duct was lawful).
151. 53 F.3d 533 (2d Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 64 U.S.L.W. 3484 (1996).
152. Id. at 534; see 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1988 & Supp. V 1993) (setting forth the
provisions of the Clean Water Act).
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when one "knowingly violates" the Act.153 In Hopkins, the trial court
instructed the jury that the knowledge requirement meant only that the
defendant must understand his conduct and that the defendant did not
need to intend to violate the law or have specific knowledge of the statute
or regulation to be convicted. 154 The court instructed further that the
requirement of knowledge may be satisfied if the defendant "willfully or
intentionally remained ignorant of relevant material facts." '155 Hopkins
appealed his conviction, arguing that the trial court should have in-
structed the jury that the prosecution must prove that he knew he was
violating the law.
1 56
The Second Circuit confirmed the trial court's instructions, holding that
it need not be shown that the defendant knew the act was illegal. 157 The
court reasoned that the substances the defendant used were "of the type
that would alert any ordinary user to the likelihood of stringent regula-
tion." '158 The court distinguished the word knowingly from the word will-
fully, stating that the term willfully has been defined as requiring the
defendant to be aware that he violated the law.'5 9 The court noted that
in 1987, Congress amended § 1319(c)(2)(A) of the Clean Water Act,
changing the term willfully to knowingly.' 6° This provided compelling ev-
idence that Congress intented to require only proof of knowledge of the
act and not of the law.
161
153. Hopkins, 53 F.3d at 537; see 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(2) (1988) (imposing liability for a
violation of the Clean Water Act).
154. Hopkins, 53 F.3d at 536; see infra note 161 (discussing the public welfare offense
doctrine).
155. Hopkins, 53 F.3d at 537.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 541.
158. Id. at 539. In this case, the defendant was the Vice President of a metal manufac-
turer that generated substantial wastewater. Id. at 534-35. He was charged with tampering
with the wastewater testing and falsifying reports to the Department of Environmental
Protection. Id. at 535. When dealing with hazardous wastes, the public welfare offense
doctrine applies, which assumes that the defendant knew the area was regulated. See gen-
erally Cooney, supra note 14, at 41 (discussing the public welfare offense doctrine as it
relates to environmental crimes).
159. Hopkins, 53 F.3d at 540 (citing United States v. Murdock, 290 U.S. 389, 396
(1933)).
160. Id.; see 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(2)(A) (1988 & Supp V 1993).
161. Hopkins, 53 F.3d at 540. This. holding is consistent with the treatment of other
environmental violations where courts have imposed what is referred to as "strict liability"
under the public offense doctrine. See Cooney, supra note 14, at 41 (noting that in most
prosecutions under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act the government was not
required to prove that the defendant knew the waste product was hazardous or that he
needed a permit). "Strict liability" is actually a misnomer because there is a requirement
that the defendant be conscious of his act. See id. at 45 (referring to the level of culpability
as "a form of strict liability" and acknowledging that the government does have to prove
some awareness by the defendant of his act, however slight that might be) (emphasis ad-
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Whether the Supreme Court has provided certainty in the law with re-
spect to the interpretation of the term knowingly and willfully is debata-
ble;162 however, the Court has applied its analysis consistently. 163
Analyzing the language of the statute, legislative intent, and, if all other
methods of interpretation fail, applying the rule of lenity will determine
the requisite criminal state of mind."6
ded). Because the acts receiving strict liability treatment are so invidious, however, it is
assumed that the defendant had knowledge of his act and this knowledge need not be
proved. See id. Thus, liability is referred to in terms of strict liability. Id. at 41 (referring
to liability under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act as "impos[ing] liability on
what, for practical purposes, is a strict liability basis").
The public welfare offense doctrine assumes criminal liability when a reasonable person
should know the conduct is subject "to stringent public regulation and may seriously
threaten the community's health or safety." Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419, 433
(1985); see also United States v. Freed, 401 U.S. 601, 609 (1971) (imposing criminal liability
on a defendant possessing hand grenades, stating that "one would hardly be surprised to
learn that possession of hand grenades is not an innocent act"); United States v. Dot-
terweich, 320 U.S. 277, 284 (1943) (holding a corporate officer criminally liable for shipping
adulterated drugs even though the defendant may not have been conscious that his act was
illegal). This doctrine imposes "strict liability" for violations which entail materials so ob-
viously dangerous that it must be presumed that one is aware of the regulation. See
Cooney, supra note 14, at 45 (citing United States v. International Minerals and Chem.
Corp., 402 U.S. 558, 565 (1971)) (noting that where dangerous or obnoxious waste materi-
als are involved, it is assumed that the defendant was aware of the regulation); cf.
Liparota, 471 U.S. at 433 (distinguishing food stamps from hand grenades or adulterated
drugs and stating that the former do not fall under the public welfare offense doctrine).
Many environmental cases involving hazardous waste fall under the public welfare of-
fense doctrine. See Cooney, supra note 14, at 41 (noting that courts have not required the
government to show that the defendant knew the material was a hazardous waste product
or that a permit was needed). More recent environmental legislation has been more am-
biguous. See id. at 47. These regulations seem to depart from those traditionally falling
under the public welfare offense doctrine and are more similar to tax law, which is inter-
preted to apply a more stringent standard on the prosecution. See supra notes 93-100 and
accompanying text (discussing the interpretation of "willful" in tax law as requiring knowl-
edge of the law). If the environmental regulations are interpreted as being as facially con-
fusing as tax law, the courts may apply the tax law exception to these regulations as well.
See Ratzlaf v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 655, 667 (1994) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (noting
that the definition of "willfully" as applied to tax law is considered an exception to the
traditional rule that ignorance of the law is no excuse, and is applied because the tax laws
are so complex).
162. See Cooney, supra note 14, at 46 (arguing that in Liparota, the Court did not
provide the lower court with meaningful guidance for determining which crimes justified
application of an exception to the rule that knowledge of the law is assumed).
163. Id. at 49-50 (interpreting the holdings in Ratzlaf, Posters 'n' Things, and Staples to
show that the Supreme Court defers to Congress to change the "default setting on the
mental element of a crime" and, absent action by Congress, the lower courts are not free to
dispense with the normal showing of the mental state required for criminal liability).
164. See supra notes 81-83 and accompanying text (discussing the Court's statutory
analysis).
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C. Public Policy Considerations
The definition of the term knowingly and willfully has serious implica-
tions for a defendant, as it determines what the prosecution must
prove,165 as well as whether the defendant has any defenses. 66 If the
court interprets these words as meaning one merely must be conscious of
his act, then ignorance of the law is no excuse and the defendant can be
held criminally liable even if he did not know of or intend to break the
law. 16 7 Consequently, this standard reduces the prosecution's burden.
168
If the term knowingly and willfully is interpreted as meaning one must
know he is violating the law, ignorance of the law is an excuse. 1 69 Even if
the defendant knows and intends an act that violates the law, he cannot
be convicted if it cannot be shown that he knew about the law.' 70 This
imposes a much greater burden on the prosecution.' 71 Additionally,
under this definition mistake of law may be a defense.172 The defendant
may claim that he believed that he complied with the law. 173 Because
165. Compare United States v. Daughtry, 48 F.3d 829, 831 (1995) (holding that the
prosecution must prove only that there was an intentional act, not that there was an inten-
tional violation of the law) with Ratzlaf, 114 S. Ct. at 663 (requiring the prosecution to
prove that the defendant knew his legal duty).
166. See Ratzlaf, 114 S. Ct. at 663 (noting that ignorance of the law is no excuse unless
Congress decrees otherwise); United States v. Zehrbach, 47 F.3d 1252, 1261 (3d Cir.) (not-
ing that mistake of law is a complete defense when knowledge of the law is an element of
the offense), cert. denied sub nom. Mervis v. United States, 115 S. Ct. 1699 (1995).
167. See United States v. Freed, 401 U.S. 601, 612 (1971) (Brennan, J., concurring)
(stating that the ordinary intent requirement does not require knowledge that the act is
illegal).
168. See Ratzlaf, 114 S. Ct. at 663 n.19 (acknowledging that requiring proof that the
defendant knew the act violated the law imposes an increased burden on the prosecution).
169. See id. at 663 (holding that, for the currency structuring statute, Congress has man-
dated an exception to the rule that ignorance of the law is no excuse).
170. See id. (noting that the jury must find that the defendant knew his conduct was
unlawful to convict under the currency structuring statute).
171. See Cheek v. United States, 498 U.S. 192, 201-02 (1991) (commenting that the
burden of proving that the defendant knows the law requires "negating a defendant's claim
of ignorance of the law or a claim that because of a misunderstanding of the law, he had a
good-faith belief that he was not violating any of the provisions of the . . . law[ I"). In
Cheek, the court held that a defendant's good-faith belief that he was not violating the law
does not have to be reasonable, id. at 203, exemplifying the heavy burden on the prosecu-
tion. Cf. Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419, 433-34 (1985) (requiring the prosecution
to prove the defendant knew the law does not put an onerous burden on the government).
Unlike Cheek, the Liparota Court held that the prosecution does not need to show that the
defendant knew of a specific regulation. Liparota, 471 U.S. at 434. Rather, circumstantial
evidence may be used to show that the defendant knew the act was illegal. Id.; see Rock-
elli, supra note 54, at 553 (noting that because of the uncertainty over what conduct is
prohibited under the anti-kickback provision, requiring knowledge of the law poses "a high
hurdle for the government to clear").
172. See supra note 74 (discussing mistake of law as a defense).
173. See Tully & Hooper, supra note 16, at 849 (noting that a good faith belief that
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ignorance or mistake of law is the exception rather than the rule, Con-
gress should indicate whether this exception should apply to the anti-
kickback provision.
174
A second policy consideration is determining the balance between the
desire to prevent fraud and abuse in the Medicare system 175 and the need
to protect individuals from severe punishment for a crime committed in-
advertently. 176 In 1977, Congress recognized that penalizing a violation
of the anti-kickback provision as a misdemeanor did not work as a suffi-
cient deterrent for fraud.17 7 Therefore, Congress amended the statute to
make violations punishable as a felony.1 78 Because the statute remains
unclear, and what constitutes a violation remains uncertain 17 9 a person
may be convicted of a felony for a crime the person did not understand
he committed. 18° Characterization of the crime as a felony, coupled with
a requirement that the prosecution prove that the defendant knew he
violated the law, may establish the proper balance to ensure the abate-
ment of fraud while protecting the individual.181
one's conduct was not unlawful is a full defense under the anti-kickback provision, regard-
less of whether the belief is reasonable); supra notes 72-75 and accompanying text (discuss-
ing mistake of law).
174. See Ratzlaf, 114 S. Ct. at 663 (stating that ignorance of the law is no defense to a
criminal charge unless otherwise decreed by Congress).
175. See supra notes 5-7 and accompanying text (discussing the problem of fraud and
abuse related to Medicare).
176. See Staples v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 1793, 1802 (1994) (noting that the statutory
penalty is considered for purposes of determining whether to dispense with a mens rea
requirement in a statute without an explicit mens rea). The Court in Staples refused to
dispense with a mens rea requirement for a crime that was punishable as a felony. Id.; see
also Ratzlaf, 114 S. Ct. at 660-61 (finding it reasonable to require the prosecution to prove
knowledge of the law because currency structuring can be committed inadvertently);
Michael L. Travers, Mistake of Law in Mala Prohibita Crimes, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1301,
1320 (1995) (noting that a citizen should not be punished unless fair warning is given of
what the law intends).
177. See supra note 32 (discussing Congress' concern that misdemeanor penalties were
insufficient to deter fraud and abuse).
178. See supra notes 29-40 and accompanying text (discussing the amendments to the
anti-kickback provision).
179. See supra note 54 (discussing the courts' attempts to clarify the ambiguities of the
anti-kickback provision).
180. Conversely, the ambiguities in the statute may make it unenforceable, thus defeat-
ing its purpose of preventing fraud. See Rockelli, supra note 40, at 190 (noting that the
Department of Health and Human Services has enforced the anti-fraud statute less aggres-
sively because of the law's ambiguity).
181. The 8th Amendment of the Constitution prohibits excessive punishment. U.S.
CONsr. amend. VIII. Stated differently, punishment must be proportionate to the defend-
ant's culpability. Alexander v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 2766, 2784 (1993); TXO Prod.
Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp., 113 S. Ct. 2711, 2730 (1993); Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S.
277, 284-85 (1983). If the prosecution had a reduced burden of proof, they "undoubtedly
would obtain more convictions and bring more charges under the statutes given the in-
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A final consideration is the due process requirement of notice.182 It is
well settled that a citizen must have fair warning of what constitutes ille-
gal conduct.18 3 Because the anti-kickback provision is so ambiguous, so-
ciety arguably is not on notice as to what conduct the law prohibits.
184
Requiring knowledge of the law and an intent to disobey the law ensures
that a defendant who lacked fair warning of the prohibited conduct is not
held criminally liable in violation of due process.'
8 5
III. THE HANLESTER DECISION-IGNORANCE OF THE LAW is
AN ExcuSE
In Hanlester Network v. Shalala, s6 the Ninth Circuit interpreted the
term knowingly and willfully to require knowledge of a violation of the
law for purposes of the anti-kickback provision of the Social Security
Act.187 The court, however, did not provide a detailed analysis leading to
its conclusion.1
8 8
The court in Hanlester acknowledged the hierarchical analysis the
creased likelihood of success on the merits of their cases." James Morsch, The Problem of
Motive in Hate Crimes: The Argument Against Presumptions of Racial Motivations, 82 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 659, 674 (1991). Therefore, increasing the mens rea require-
ment to knowledge of the law would reduce the number of convictions, but when the pros-
ecutor does meet his burden, the defendant will be convicted of a felony and punished
accordingly.
182. A criminal statute must be sufficiently definite in order to give notice of the pro-
hibited conduct. Lambert v. California, 355 U.S. 225, 228 (1957); Boyce Motor Lines v.
United States, 342 U.S. 337, 340 (1952); McBoyle v. United States, 283 U.S. 25, 27 (1931);
see also Travers, supra note 176, at 1320-22 (noting that a presumption that every person
knows the law in a time when the law is complex and unclear does not provide due process
of law).
183. Lambert, 355 U.S. at 228 ("Engrained in our concept of due process is the require-
ment of notice."); see also Simonoff, supra note 18, at 411-12 (noting that the notion of fair
warning is well grounded in the Constitution).
184. This argument was posed by the appellants in Hanlester. Hanlester Network v.
Shalala, 51 F.3d 1390, 1397 (9th Cir. 1995). The court rejected the argument, stating that
the scienter requirement mitigates any vagueness. Id. at 1397-98; see also United States v.
Neufeld, 908 F. Supp. 491, 497 (S.D. Ohio 1995) (noting that the requirement that a viola-
tion of the anti-kickback provision be willfull "eviscerates any claim of vagueness").
185. The concept of fair warning is tied to the concept of lenity, because a defendant
should not be criminally liable for something he did not understand to be illegal. Ratzlaf v.
United States, 114 S. Ct. at 655, 663 (1994). Therefore, any ambiguity should be decided in
favor of the defendant, and interpreting knowingly and willfully as requiring knowledge of
the law is an interpretation favorable to the defendant. Id.
186. 51 F.3d 1390 (9th Cir. 1995).
187. Id. at 1400; see supra note 11 (providing the language of the anti-kickback statute).
188. See Hanlester, 51 F.3d at 1400 (concluding that, consistent with the interpretations
in Pomponio and Ratzlaf, knowingly and willfully should be defined as requiring the de-
fendant to have the "specific intent to disobey the law").
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Supreme Court employs for statutory interpretation. 18 9 It did not discuss
this analysis, however, when it determined the definition of the term
knowingly and willfully.' 90 Instead, the court applied that analysis to a
different issue-whether the term "in return for" required proof of an
agreement.' 91 When the court turned to the issue of whether the scienter
requirement should be interpreted as requiring knowledge of the law or
rhierely knowledge of the act, it simply cited cases that defined the term
knowingly and willfully as requiring knowledge of the law and concluded
that knowledge of the law is required. 192 The cases cited, however, do
not suggest that the definition of the term willfully applied in those in-
stances is a general definition to be applied in all situations. 193 To the
contrary, those opinions note that "willfully is a word of many mean-
ings"' 94 and that each individual statute should be interpreted in con-
text.' 95 To construe these holdings as defining the word in general is
189. See id. at 1397 (stating that when a court interprets a statute it first should look to
the statutory language, then look to the legislative history, and finally employ the rule of
lenity).
190. See id. at 1399-1400 (interpreting the scienter requirement for the anti-kickback
provision with little analysis of the statute itself).
191. Id. 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(b)(1)(A) requires that remuneration be "in return for"
referrals. 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(b)(1)(A) (1988); see supra note 11 (providing the language
of the statute). The appellants claimed that the language "in return for" suggests quid pro
quo and requires a contract. Hanlester, 51 F.3d at 1396-97. The court looked to the lan-
guage of the statute and the legislative history and concluded that an agreement is not
required for a violation of the anti-kickback provision. Id. at 1397.
192. Id. at 1399-1400. The Hanlester court cited three cases to support its discussion of
the scienter requirement: Ratzlaf v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 655, 657 (1994) (stating that
to prove willfulness the government must prove the defendant knew his conduct was un-
lawful); United States v. Pomponio, 429 U.S. 10, 12 (1976) (per curiam) (defining the term
willfully as "a voluntary, intentional violation of a known legal duty"); United States v.
Dahlstrom, 713 F.2d 1423, 1427 (9th Cir. 1983) (holding that the word willfully requires
proof of specific intent to do what the law forbids), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 980 (1984).
193. See Ratzlaf, 114 S. Ct. at 657 (defining willfully, as used in the currency structuring
statute, as requiring the prosecution to prove that the defendant knew his conduct was
unlawful); Dahlstrom, 713 F.2d at 1427 (noting that willfully, as used in tax law, requires
proof of a specific intent to do an act which violates the law).
194. Spies v. United States, 317 U.S. 492, 497 (1943); see also Ratzlaf, 114 S. Ct. at 659;
Pomponio, 429 U.S. at 12 (noting that in the context of tax law, willfully means a "volun-
tary, intentional violation of a known legal duty," inferring that the term has other mean-
ings for other contexts); Dahlstrom, 713 F.2d at 1427 (stating that the Supreme Court has
defined the term willfully for purposes of the tax law to require knowledge of the law).
195. See Ratzlaf, 114 S. Ct. at 659 (recognizing that the construction of "willful" is
"'often ... influenced by its context' ") (quoting Spies, 317 U.S. at 497); Dahlstrom, 713
F.2d at 1427 (stating that "[tihe Supreme Court has defined the term 'willfully' under sec-
tion 7206 to mean a 'voluntary intentional violation of a known legal duty' ") (emphasis
added).
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missing the crux of the opinions. 9 6 In each case Hanlester cites, the court
painstakingly executed its analysis to determine the meaning of willful in
that particular context, 197 and did not provide a mandatory definition for
the word. 9 Rather, the courts provided guidance on how to analyze a
statute to determine the most appropriate definition.' 99 Despite
Hanlester's inadequate analysis, its conclusion is consistent with the hold-
ings of the Supreme Court.2 00
A. Legal Analysis of the Hanlester Decision
1. The Language of the Anti-kickback Provision
Had the Hanlester court applied the analysis used in the cases it cited, it
first would have looked to the language of the statute.20 ' In looking at
the language of the anti-kickback provision,20 2 the statutory meaning of
the term knowingly and willfully is ambiguous; it does not have explicit
language that dictates that the defendant must know the law, as did the
statute at issue in Ratzlaf v. United States. 20 3 In Ratzlaf, the Court fo-
196. See Ratzlaf, 114 S. Ct. at 660 (stating that on occasion willfulness has been inter-
preted to require proof of a known legal duty).
197. Id. at 662-63 (discussing the language of the statute, the legislative history, and the
rule of lenity); see also Travers, supra note 176, at 1311 (stating that the Court in Ratzlaf
"took great pains to indicate that it was not creating a universal new definition of
willfulness").
198. See Ratzlaf, 114 S. Ct. at 663 (noting that while the general rule is that ignorance of
the law is no excuse, Congress may decree otherwise, which is what they have done with
respect to 31 U.S.C. § 5322(a)).
199. See id. at 659-63 (explaining the analysis used in statutory construction).
200. See supra note 54 (discussing the appropriateness of requiring knowledge of the
law in ambiguous statutes to prevent the criminalization of apparently innocent conduct,
and noting that the anti-kickback provision is ambiguous); supra note 140 (noting that the
use of both knowingly and willfully in the anti-kickback provision is evidence that Con-
gress intended that the prosecution prove more than mere knowledge of the act); supra
note 150 (noting that the anti-kickback provision may be violated without evil motive, thus
necessitating a requirement that the defendant know the law and intend to violate it in
order to prevent punishment of the inadvertent actor).
201. Ratzlaf, 114 S. Ct. at 662 (noting that the Court need not look to legislative history
to interpret the meaning of a statute if the language of the statute is clear).
202. See supra note 11 (providing the language of the anti-kickback statute, 42 U.S.C.
§ 1320a-7b(b)) (1988 & Supp. V 1993)).
203. That the anti-kickback provision is ambiguous is evidenced by the amount of liti-
gation related to interpreting the statute. See supra note. 54 '(summarizing case law inter-
preting the statute). Additionally, the Stark laws, also criticized for being ambiguous, were
an effort to clarify what conduct was illegal. See supra note 38 (discussing the purpose of
the Stark laws). The Hanlester opinion primarily was focused on interpreting the statute.
See Hanlester Network v. Shalala, 51 F.3d 1390, 1397-1400 (9th Cir. 1995) (interpreting the
terms "in return for," "remuneration," "induce," and "knowingly and willfully").
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cused on the word "purpose" in § 5324 and "willful" in § 5322.204 The
Court concluded that the statute requires both knowledge of the report-
ing requirement and knowledge of the duty not to avoid triggering the
report.2 °5 Noting that currency structuring is not "inevitably nefarious,"
the Court found that the language of the statute clearly requires that the
defendant knew that he violated the law.2 °6
While there is no language in the anti-kickback provision defining the
meaning of the term knowingly and willfully, the language clearly indi-
cates a heightened mens rea in this statute compared with others.2 °7 The
statutes analyzed above contain a mens rea requirement of knowingly or
willfully, but not both.20 s Congress used the phrase knowingly and will-
fully rather than the merely the word knowingly or the word willfully
individually or no explicit mens rea requirement at all in the anti-kick-
back provision, which may have led the Hanlester court to conclude that
the government had a heightened burden of proof.2 09 The term know-
ingly generally requires knowledge of the act.2 a0 Therefore, it is logical
that the use of the words knowingly and willfully together require both
knowledge of the act and knowledge of the law. 1 x
2. The Legislative History-Evidence Of Congress' Intent to Require
Knowledge of the Law
With ambiguous statutory language, the court next will review the con-
gressional intent.212 In reviewing Congress' intent in enacting the anti-
204. Ratzlaf, 114 S. Ct. at 660 (noting that the statute " 'requires proof that the defend-
ant acted with the purpose to evade the reporting requirement of Section 5313(a)' ").
205. Id. at 662.
206. Id.
207. See supra note 11 (providing the language of the anti-kickback provision); see also
supra notes 133-40 and accompanying text (discussing Hayden and the conclusion that the
use of knowingly and willfully suggests that willfully requires more than mere knowledge
of the act).
208. See, e.g., Ratzlaf, 114 S. Ct. at 657 (addressing the definition of willfully); Liparota
v. United States, 471 U.S. 419, 420 (1985) (interpreting the term knowingly); Spies v.
United States, 317 U.S. 492, 494 (1943) (determining the meaning of willfully).
209. See United States v. Hayden, 64 F.3d 126, 130 (3d. Cir. 1995) (noting that Con-
gress' use of both the word knowingly and the word willfully indicates that willfully has a
scienter requirement distinct from that required by knowingly).
210. See supra notes 44-45 and accompanying text (discussing the general definition of
knowingly).
211. See Hayden, 64 F.3d at 130 (concluding that, because the statutory language con-
tains both knowingly and willfully, willfully means the defendant must have known that his
conduct was illegal); United States v. Obiechie, 38 F.3d 309, 315 (7th Cir. 1994) (concluding
that "the only reasonable distinction between... [the] 'knowingly' and 'willfully' standards
is that the latter requires knowledge of the law").
212. See supra note 82 (discussing the use of legislative history).
19961 Medicare Anti-kickback Provision
kickback provision, however, the legislative history provides little gui-
dance.213 Congress apparently was concerned with protecting the inad-
vertent actor.214 It remains unclear, however, whether it is the
commission of the act or the violation the law that must be inadvertent to
be protected from criminal liability.215
That Congress added the term knowingly and willfully to the statute216
-is some evidence that its intent was to require knowledge of the law.217
This theory is especially compelling with respect to § 1320a-7b(b)(2), the
section of the anti-kickback provision which involves the offering of re-
munerations to induce a person to refer a Medicare patient.21 8 To "in-
duce" means to "influence ... an act or course of conduct., 219 This term
implicitly suggests some knowledge of the act or some purpose.220 It can
be inferred, as the Court in Ratzlaf did in examining the words purpose
and willful, that the combination of the word induce with the words
knowingly and willfully requires more than knowledge of the act.22' Sec-
tion 1320a-7b(b)(1), regarding the receipt of remunerations in exchange
for referrals, does not contain language such as the word induce. 222 How-
ever, the meaning of the word willfully will be the same in this provision
as it is in § 1320a-7b(b)(2), regarding the offering of remunerations in
exchange for referrals, because "[a] term appearing in several places in a
statutory text is generally read the same way each time it appears. ,223
213. See Miller, supra note 13, at 2-3 (noting that the legislative history does not make
it clear whether the defendant must intend the conduct or must intend to violate the law);
infra note 214 (providing the comments of the committee reviewing the Act).
214. See H.R. REP. No. 1167., 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 59 (1980), reprinted in 1980
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5526, 5572 (stating that "[t]he Committee is concerned that criminal penal-
ties may be imposed under current law to an individual whose conduct, while improper,
was inadvertent").
215. Miller, supra note 13. at 2-3.
216. See Omnibus Reconciliation Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-499 § 917, 94 Stat. 2599,
2625 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(b) (1988 & Supp. V 1993)) (adding the
requirement that the defendant act knowingly and willfully).
217. See supra note 211 (discussing the inclusion of both knowingly and willfully as
evidence of a requirement that the defendant must know the law).
218. 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(b)(2) (1988).
219. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 775 (6th ed. 1990).
220. See supra notes 118-21 and accompanying text (discussing the Court's analysis of
the words purpose and willful); cf Ratzlaf, 114 S. Ct. 655, 660 (1994) (looking at the word
purpose coupled with the word willful to conclude that willful means that the defendant
must have knowledge of the law).
221. See Ratzlaf, 114 S. Ct. at 663 (noting that Congress has explicitly departed from
the general rule that ignorance of the law is no excuse with respect to the anti-structuring
statute).
222. See supra note 11 (providing the language of § 1320a-7(b)(1)).
223. Ratzlaf, 114 S. Ct. at 660 (citing Estate of Cowart v. Nicklos Drilling Co., 505 U.S.
469 (1992)); see supra note 11 (providing the language of § 1320a-7b(b)(1) and (2)).
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There is an argument that the act of soliciting or offering the kickback
must be knowingly and willfully, rather than the violation of the law that
makes it illegal to solicit or offer a kickback.22 4 As the court found in
Daughtry, the language of the statute does not indicate that the law is
violated only if the defendant knew the law and intended to disregard
it.22 5 In Daughtry, the court found that the statute was violated when the
defendant knew he made a false statement, and there is no requirement
that the prosecution show that the defendant knew that making a false
statement violated the law.226 Because certain business arrangements are
not illegal, however, it is arguable that one may violate the anti-kickback
provision inadvertently, or without an "evil motive. ''2 27 This proposition
rebuts the argument that one need not know the law to be convicted of
the offense, as that interpretation is applicable when the statute cannot be
violated without evil motive. 2 8
3. The Rule of Lenity
There are compelling arguments to conclude that the legislative history
shows that "knowingly and willfully" requires knowledge of the law in the
anti-kickback statute.22 9 Thus, the analysis may end.23° Traditionally,
however, courts apply the rule of lenity if the legislative history is ambig-
uous. 21 Because there is some ambiguity in the legislative history of the
anti-kickback provision, the court may apply the rule of lenity. The rule
of lenity prescribes that ambiguity must be decided in favor of the de-
fendant.2 32 Therefore, as in Liparota, a court, when analyzing the anti-
224. This is analogous to the argument the government made in Ratzlaf. 114 S. Ct. at
660. There, the government argued that it was sufficient that the defendant knew there
was a reporting requirement and intended to circumvent the requirement. Id. The Court
rejected that argument because it could result in the criminalization of innocent conduct.
Id.
225. See United States v. Daughtry, 48 F.3d 829, 831 (4th Cir.) (recognizing that knowl-
edge of the law is not required for a violation of the false statement statute), cert. granted
and judgment vacated on other grounds, 116 S. Ct. 510 (1995); see also supra notes 141-50
and accompanying text (discussing the case).
226. Daughtry, 48 F.3d at 831.
227. See supra note 54 (discussing the ambiguity in the law and the risk of inadvertent
conduct being criminalized).
228. See supra note 54 (discussing the difficulty that courts have had with determining
whether seemingly legitimate business transactions constitute kickbacks).
229. See supra notes 212-28 and accompanying text (discussing the legislative history of
the statute).
230. See Staples v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 1793, 1804 n.17 (1994) (stating that the rule
of lenity is applied only when the court has looked to all other sources of interpretation
and the statute remains ambiguous).
231. See supra note 83 (discussing the application of the rule of lenity).
232. See supra note 83 (discussing the rule of lenity).
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kickback provision, should interpret the term knowingly and willfully to
mean the defendant must know he is violating the law.
233
The court is limited in its ability to interpret statutes, and it will not
impute an unjustified meaning to a statute.234 As stated above, the lan-
guage of the anti-kickback provision and its legislative history suggested
to the court that Congress' intent was to require a showing of knowledge
of the law.2 35 Additionally, the application of the rule of lenity would
also have required the court to hold that a showing of knowledge of the
law is required.236 Therefore, if Congress disagrees with the Ninth Cir-
cuit's interpretation of the anti-kickback provision, it must take legisla-
tive action.
2 37
4. The Inapplicability of the Public Welfare Offense Doctrine
The anti-kickback provision is not the type of statute that would fall
under the public welfare offense doctrine. 23 The public welfare offense
doctrine, which creates virtually strict liability, typically is applied to con-
duct which imposes a danger to the health and safety of the commu-
nity.239 The Court applies the doctrine when a reasonable person should
know that the conduct is subject to stringent public regulation and is a
threat to the health or safety of the community. 240 Because it is unclear
what business arrangements may be legal or illegal under the anti-kick-
back provision, a reasonable person would not know that the particular
233. See Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419, 433 (1985).
234. The Court must effectuate the express intent of Congress. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v.
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984). If the intent is not
express, it must interpret the statute to reflect a permissible construction of the statute.
Id.; see also Farrar v. Hobby, 113 S. Ct. 566, 577 (1992) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (stating
that "[w]hen construing a statute, this Court is bound by the choices Congress has made,
not the choices we might wish it had made").
235. See supra text accompanying notes 201-28 (analyzing the statutory language and
legislative history with respect to the anti-kickback provision).
236. See supra text accompanying notes 229-33 (discussing the application of the rule of
lenity to the anti-kickback provision).
237. Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 115 S. Ct. 1447, 1455 (1995) (noting that, while the
legislature cannot change a decision of the court-once made, it can affect future decisions
by amending the legislation); Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Services, 436 U.S.
658, 714-15 (1978) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (stating that Congress is free to correct the
Court's mistakes in statutory construction through legislative action).
238. The public welfare offense doctrine applies to crimes that are so inherently wrong
it is assumed that the defendant knew the act was regulated. See supra note 161 (discussing
in greater detail the public welfare offense doctrine).
239. See supra note 161 (discussing the application of the public welfare offense doc-
trine to conduct involving hand grenades, drugs, and hazardous waste and noting the inap-
plicability of the doctrine to fraudulent conduct involving food stamps).
240. See Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419, 433 (1985) (rejecting application of the
public welfare offense doctrine to the statute regulating food stamps).
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conduct is regulated.241  Additionally, the primary conduct prohibited by
the act relates to the draining of federal funding from the system.242 Be-
cause this activity relates to conduct with an economic impact and not
health, welfare, and safety, courts should not interpret the anti-kickback
provision as imposing strict liability.
B. Public Policy Dictates a Conclusion Consistent With Hanlester
When the term knowingly and willfully is interpreted to require knowl-
edge of the law, ignorance of the law is an excuse, or a defense, for an
otherwise guilty defendant.243 This ignorance can operate as an excuse
for violating the law as long as one had a good-faith belief that he was
acting within the bounds of the law.244 Knowledge of the law may be
difficult for the prosecution to prove.245  Additionally, by requiring a
showing of knowledge of the law, health care professionals are granted a
favorable standard of proof, because the statute, as applied to joint ven-
tures, generally affects referring physicians. The idea of granting this
defense to a professional, knowledgeable in the regulated field, should be
241. See Androphy, supra note 3, at 39 (noting that to date, there are few cases inter-
preting safe harbors); Morgan R. Baumgartner, Note, Physician Self-Referral and Joint
Ventures Prohibitions: Necessary Shield Against Abusive Practices or Over Regulation?, 19
J. CORP. L. 313, 324 (1994) (noting that it is difficult to distinguish between fraudulent
business practices and legitimate relationships); Puryear, supra note 8, at 308 (noting that
whether a joint venture violates the anti-fraud statute is not entirely predictable, since
there are some ventures that are not protected by regulatory "safe harbors," but do not
necessarily violate the anti-fraud statute).
242. See supra note 31 (discussing the amendment to the Social Security Act in re-
sponse to the problem of increased fraudulent activity).
243. See Ratzlaf v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 655, 664 (1994). (Blackmun, J., dissenting)
(arguing that the majority's holding that "willfulness" requires knowledge of the law ne-
gates the general rule that ignorance and mistake of law is no excuse); United States v.
Zehrbach, 47 F.3d 1252, 1261 (3d Cir. 1995) (noting that when knowledge of illegality is an
element of a crime, mistake of law is a complete defense), cert. denied sub nom. Mervis v.
United States, 115 S. Ct. 1699 (1995); supra note 72 (noting that negating the mental state
because of mistake is similar in concept to the prosecution's inability to prove the mental
state).
244. See Cheek v. United States, 498 U.S. 192, 203 (1991) (stating that a good faith
belief, even an unreasonable one, is sufficient to negate the willfulness requirement).
245. See Ratzlaf, 114 S. Ct. at 669-70 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (arguing that requiring
proof of knowledge of the law will make the prosecution's task difficult or impossible in
most cases). However, it is not impossible to persuade a jury that the defendant knew of
his legal duty. See id. at 663 n.19 (noting that a jury may find the requisite knowledge on
the part of the defendant by drawing inferences from circumstantial evidence).
246. Due to the nature of the statute, offenders are likely to be health care profession-
als, possibly physicians. See 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(b) (1988 & Supp. V 1993) (regulating the
referral of patients receiving benefits from Medicare or state health care programs). Physi-
cians are not only well-educated, but they are specialists in the field regulated by the stat-
ute. Merely because someone is well-educated or professionally involved in the regulated
area does not mean he should be assumed to know the law. The jury may consider these
1996] Medicare Anti-kickback Provision
contrasted with laws where ignorance of the law is no defense.247
For example, in New York City, it is a traffic violation to make a right
turn at a red light.248 If a California resident is driving in New York City,
he will be guilty of such a violation, regardless of whether he knew the
law existed.249 In contrast, under the Hanlester interpretation of the anti-
kickback provision, one would not be guilty of a violation if he did not
know the law.25° While this may appear unjust, there is a fundamental
and significant distinction between the two circumstances.
Applying the analysis used in tax law,251 the difference between the
right on red and the kickback is that if one were to read the New York
ordinance, that person clearly would understand the law.252 Conversely,
if one were to read the anti-kickback provision, he rightfully would be
confused as to what conduct was prohibited.253 Though it may seem un-
just to hold an innocently ignorant lay person guilty of an offense of
which he had no knowledge, while excusing an educated professional, the
focus is not on the educational level of the violator. Rather, the responsi-
bility of learning the law is placed on every citizen.254 If a person at-
factors, however, in determining whether the defendant actually did know the law. See
Ratzlaf, 114 S. Ct. at 663 n.19.
247. Unless there is an exception, ignorance of the law is no excuse for a statutory
violation. Ratzlaf, 114 S. Ct. at 663; Cheek, 498 U.S. at 199.
248. N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 1111(d)(2)(a) (McKinney 1994).
(2) Except in a city having a population of one million or more, unless a sign is in
place prohibiting such turn:
(a) Traffic facing a steady circular red signal may cautiously enter the intersection
to make a right turn after stopping as required by paragraph one of this subdivi-
sion, except that right turning traffic is not required to stop when a steady right
green arrow signal is shown at the same time.
Id. (emphasis added).
249. See United States v. Freed, 401 U.S. 601, 612 (1971) (Brennan, J., concurring) (not-
ing that "ignorance of the law is no excuse" means that the defendant does not have to
know the law to be blameworthy).
250. Hanlester Network v. Shalala, 51 F.3d 1390, 1400 (9th Cir. 1995).
251. See supra notes 93-102 and accompanying text (discussing the rule carved out in
cases involving tax law).
252. See supra note 248 (providing the text of N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 1111 (d)(2)(a)
(McKinney 1994)); see also United States v. Liddy, 397 F. Supp. 947, 954 (D.D.C. 1975)
(stating that "ignorance of the law is no excuse" and that one may be liable for a violation
of the law whether or not he has seen the statute), aff'd, 530 F.2d 1094 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
denied, 426 U.S. 937 (1976).
253. See Baumgartner, supra note 241, at 324 (noting that a liberal interpretation of
the "anti-fraud statutes could cover many business arrangements such as physician incen-
tive programs, physician and hospital joint ventures, physician recruitment programs, and
other such arrangements that are natural responses to the constant changes in the health
care industry").
254. United States v. R.L.C., 503 U.S. 291, 311-12 (1992) (Thomas, J., concurring); At-
kins v. Parker, 472 U.S. 115, 130 (1985); North Laramie Land Co. v. Hoffman, 268 U.S. 276,
283 (1925).
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tempts to learn the law, but could not understand it, that person may be
excused.255
Without the proposition that every person is presumed to know the
law, it would be an affirmative defense to argue that the defendant is not
guilty because he never researched the law.256 Understandably it is diffi-
cult to sympathize with a lawyer or police officer who claims he did not
know that a right turn on red is prohibited in New York City because he
is not from the area. Yet. it remains a different issue whether society
should excuse an illiterate person who does not have the educational
tools to research the law. Because it is impossible to know where to draw
the line, the courts have required society to learn the law.257 Only when
one attempts to learn the law and still does not understand it do the
courts make an exception.25s
If limited to those crimes not "inherently evil,"259 the interpretation of
"knowingly and willfully" as requiring knowledge of the law can be
viewed as providing protection to those who did not know, and arguably
should not have known, that their conduct was illegal.26° This analysis
comports with the framework of the American judicial system, which fa-
vors the defendant in instances of ambiguity.
261
255. See Cheek v. United States, 498 U.S. 192, 200 (1991) (carving out an exception to
the general notion that all citizens are presumed to know the law in the case of tax law
because it is so confusing).
256. See United States v. Baker, 63 F.3d 1478, 1491 (9th Cir. 1995) (noting that there
are two exceptions to the assumption that every person knows the law: an independent
misunderstanding of a legal condition, such as the defendant mistakenly thinking he was
buying a gun from a person who was selling it legally, and complex regulatory schemes),
cert. denied, 133 L. Ed. 2d 767 (1996).
257. See Cheek, 498 U.S. at 199 (noting that generally everyone is presumed to know
the law); Ratzlaf v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 655, 663 (1994) (noting that ignorance of the
law is not a defense to a criminal charge unless Congress decrees otherwise).
258. See Cheek, 498 U.S. at 199-200 (recognizing an exception for tax law to the com-
mon law rule that everyone knows the law because tax law is difficult for the average
person to understand); Baker, 63 F.3d at 1491 (noting an exception to the general rule that
ignorance of the law is no excuse when the statute is complex).
259. It has been stated that "willfulness" requires some evil motive. See Spies v. United
States, 317 U.S. 492, 498 (1943); United States v. Murdock, 290 U.S. 389, 395 (1933) (noting
that an evil motive is an element of the crime of willfully failing to pay taxes). Further, a
defendant should not be convicted of crimes that are not inherently evil if he did not know
the law. Ratzlaf, 114 S. Ct. at 660-61.
260. Because it is unclear which business ventures are legal and which are not, a de-
fendant may violate the anti-kickback provision inadvertently, with no evil motive. See
Rockelli, supra note 54, at 553 (noting that" 'the anti-kickback statute covers conduct that
is not inherently bad' ") (quoting Sanford Teplitzky). With a statute so ambiguous, it
would be unfair to hold a defendant criminally liable if he did not know the law. See
generally Baumgartner, supra note 241 (discussing the difficulty in determining which con-
duct is prohibited and which is legal).
261. See supra note 83 and accompanying text (discussing the rule of lenity).
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C. The Effect of Hanlester on The Health Care Industry
It is unclear how courts will interpret a particular financial relationship
under the anti-kickback provision because the statute is not clear as to
what activities are permitted.262 This lack of clarity, along with the stat-
ute's various exceptions, creates uncertainty regarding which business re-
lationships remain legal and which result in illegal "kickbacks. '263 This
uncertainty obstructs the development of integrated health care facili-
ties. 264 Some courts have held that a physician who receives financial
gain for Medicare referrals has committed a violation, even if the physi-
cian has other reasons for referral.265 The Health Care Financing Admin-
istration interprets the provision more narrowly, finding that whether the
transaction is a violation depends upon whether the return on investment
is contingent upon the number of referrals provided.266 Hanlester, the
first case where the anti-kickback provision was applied to limited part-
nerships,267 demonstrates that many existing physician-owned ventures,
even limited partnerships, may violate the anti-fraud statutes.268 This not
only creates uncertainty, but also inhibits physicians in need of capital
from obtaining a partner or entering into a joint venture for fear of violat-
ing the law.269
262. See Baumgartner, supra note 241, at 324 (noting that a liberal interpretation of the
statute could result in including as illegal business ventures incentive programs, joint ven-
tures, recruitment programs, and other arrangements that have developed as a result of
changes in the health care industry); see also United States v. Kats, 871 F.2d 105, 108 (9th
Cir. 1989) (concluding that payments received for referrals to medical labs were illegal
under the statute even if the referral was made for reasons other than financial gain);
United States v. Greber, 760 F.2d 68, 72 (3d Cir.) (concluding that compensation for serv-
ices can be illegal under the anti-kickback statute if the defendant intended the payments
to induce referrals). cert. denied, 474 U.S. 988 (1985).
263. See Rockelli, supra note 54, at 553 (noting the uncertainty in the anti-kickback
provision).
264. Woodhall, supra note 31, at 190.
265. Kats, 871 F.2d at 108; Greber, 760 F.2d at 72; see also Farley, supra note 9, at 172
(noting that courts have interpreted the anti-fraud statute broadly).
266. Baumgartner, supra note 241, at 325.
267. Id.; see Hanlester Network v. Shalala, 51 F.3d 1390 (9th Cir. 1995) (finding that
actions of general partnerships, individuals, and joint ventures are subject to the restric-
tions of the anti-kickback provision); see also William S. Painter, Recent Legislation, Cases,
and Economic and Other Developments Affecting Health Care Providers and Integrated
Delivery Systems, in QUALIFIED PLANS, PC's, AND WELFARE BENEFITS 1, 7 (Ali-Aba
Course of Study Materials No. C980, 1995) (stating that Hanlester substantially broadened
the standard for violation of the anti-kickback statute "so that a mere finding that the
[partnership] arrangement offers the physicians an opportunity to substantially profit from
the referrals is sufficient to support a finding of improper inducement").
268. Baumgartner, supra note 241, at 326.
269. See Puryear, supra note 8, at 296-98 (discussing the formation of a joint venture as
a means by which a physician can contribute or generate capital). A physician may be
involved in various forms of joint ventures. Id. One example is a limited partnership,
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The anti-kickback provision, intended to prevent abuse of the system,
actually may impede health care reform.27° Physicians seek to own
health care facilities to maintain their competitiveness, become more effi-
cient, and provide better services.27' Thus, many of these physician-
owned ventures lower the cost of providing health care. 272 Because of
the legal risk of violating the anti-kickback provision, however, there is a
chilling effect on potentially legitimate and necessary business
arrangements.273
Requiring one to know that he is violating the law makes it more diffi-
cult to convict a defendant under the anti-kickback provision. This would
allow physicians to enter into a business relationship in good faith with-
out fear of being charged with violating the anti-kickback provision.274
Without the requirement that the prosecution show that the defendant
where outside investors are general partners and the physicians are limited partners. Id. at
297. Under this type of agreement, the physicians contribute capital and are not involved
with the management of the business. Id. It typically is understood, however, that the
physicians will refer patients to the facility. Id. An example would be a limited partner-
ship clinical laboratory. Id.
When the investment requires little capital from the physician, the business relationship
may be suspect. Id. at 298. In these cases, the physician's financial contribution comes
largely from referrals. Id. Even those investments involving large amounts of capital from
the physicians can be problematic under the anti-kickback provision, however, because
there still exists an incentive to over-utilize the facility by ordering unnecessary health care
services for patients in order to reap more profits. Id. at 298-99; see also Farley, supra note
9, at 179 (stating that there is evidence that physicians over-utilize facilities in which they
have a financial interest).
270. See Fabrikant, supra note 68, at 455 (noting that litigation related to the anti-kick-
back statutes "may retard the development of the very relationship between providers that
are necessary to achieve health care reform").
271. Douglas A. Hastings, Physician-Hospital Integration: Beyond Contracting Models,
in HEALTH LAW HANDBOOK 3, 3-4 (Alice G. Gosfield ed., 1995). See generally Farley,
supra note 9, at 179 (discussing the benefits of physician investments, including competi-
tion in the marketplace, because the physician must compete with other similar facilities;
efficiency, because a variety of services are made available to the patient; and quality of
care, because the physician will have a strong working relationship with the facility in
which he has a financial interest).
272. See Phillip A. Proger & Roxane C. Busey, Update of Recent Developments, in
DEVELOPMENTS IN AN-IrRusT HEALTH CARE LAW 5 (Phillip A. Proger et al. eds., 1990);
see also Rockelli, supra note 54, at 553 (noting that the changing health care market is
more and more based on managed care and capitalization); Baumgartner, supra note 241,
at 324 (noting that business arrangements such as physician incentive programs, physician
and hospital joint ventures, physician recruitment programs, and others are responses to
the change in the health care industry).
273. See Hastings, supra note 271, at 6. It should be noted that a fully integrated facil-
ity,'such as a medical group practice, does not have as great a risk of violating the anti-
kickback provision because there is only a single economic unit. Id. at 4. Therefore, the
risk of conspiracy or collective efforts to obtain "kickbacks" is reduced. Id.
274. See Rockelli, supra note 54, at 553 (commenting on the decision in Hanlester as a
blessing for health care providers because of the high burden on the government).
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knew the law, a court can interpret the statute liberally and convict a
physician who cares for Medicare patients and happens to be involved in
a venture from which he reaps a profit.275 Additionally, discouraging
physicians from entering into relationships that may result in a violation
of the anti-kickback provision also will dissuade physicians from ac-
cepting Medicare patients.276 Therefore, the requirement that one know
he is violating the law provides a balance between the interest of protect-
ing government funds and permitting the growth and development of
health care facilities. This requirement continues to punish those who are
using the system to their financial benefit and spares those who are at-
tempting to work with the system but inadvertently violate its
provisions.277
IV. CONCLUSION
The Medicare anti-kickback provision of the Social Security Act pro-
hibits one from knowingly and willfully offering or accepting remunera-
tions for referrals of Medicare patients. Whether the term knowingly and
willfully should be interpreted as requiring knowledge of the act or
knowledge of the law is unsettled. There is strong evidence that the cor-
rect interpretation is consistent with the Ninth Circuit decision in
Hanlester Network v. Shalala 278 which held that the term knowingly and
willfully required that the defendant know he was violating the law.
The language of the anti-kickback provision is ambiguous. In looking
at the legislative history, there is evidence that the term knowingly and
willfully is intended to require knowledge that one is violating the law.
Even if it is determined that the legislative intent is not clear, however,
the application of the rule of lenity would require the term to be inter-
preted in the same way. Therefore, the court in Hanlester, although it
failed to properly articulate the appropriate analysis, arrived at the cor-
275. See Baumgartner, supra note 241, at 324 (discussing the broad range of business
relationships that may be affected if the anti-kickback provision is interpreted liberally,
such as physician incentive programs, physician and hospital joint ventures, physician re-
cruitment programs).
276. Because the anti-kickback provision applies to only Medicare and state health care
programs, physicians with questionable financial investments in health care facilities may
be willing to accept only patients with other forms of insurance coverage. See 42 U.S.C.
§ 1320a-7b (1988 & Supp. v 1993) (criminalizing only acts involving Medicare or state
health care programs).
277. See supra note 40 (discussing the failure of Stark II to balance the interest in per-
mitting the market to provide health care services with a desire to prevent abuse of the
system).
278. 51 F.3d 1390 (9th Cir. 1995).
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rect conclusion-that ignorance of the law is a legitimate excuse under
the anti-kickback statute.
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